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DOCUMENTS CROSS-REFERENCED

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ER 85-1659/1
DD: 03604/5
ER 85-1659
ER 85-2493

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DDI-~~04446~~/85

12 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence ✓

Director of Soviet Analysis

FROM: Senior Analyst for National Issues
Office of Soviet AnalysisSUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

1. Action required: None. This memorandum presents for your information some preliminary results on the structure of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, as gleaned from the first several hundred pages of transcripts from the Airlie House conference. We estimate that the transcription of the entire proceedings, when completed, will comprise about 800 pages. In addition, the 13 formal papers total almost 500 pages. As I believe you are aware, we intend to synopsize the conference proceedings in a conference report that will include the formal papers. The State Department will publish and disseminate the final product.

Ideology and Language

2. It was clear from the conference discussion that Marxist-Leninist theory determines the semantic structure of Soviet propaganda and disinformation. The Soviet world view relates all human activities to world revolution. In Soviet thinking, everything that promotes this process is good, right, and true, while everything that hampers it is bad, wrong, and false. The dichotomy between Soviet "socialism" and Western "capitalism" results in numerous stereotypes in Soviet discourse and rules out certain others. For example, "Soviet imperialism" is literally nonsense in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology, inasmuch as the term "imperialism" is defined as a particular stage of capitalism. Therefore, to the extent that these terms

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SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
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of reference are accepted by an audience, actual Soviet imperial behavior is unthinkable, a contradiction in terms.

3. Two major campaigns in recent years illustrate how the Soviet ideology sets the terms of international discourse. The first is the so-called peace program, and the second is foreign "nonintervention." Soviet socialism is, by definition of the ideology, opposed to war and in favor of peace; only Western capitalists and imperialists are "warmongers." Thus, to be for the peace program means to be in favor of disarming the warmongering opposition. Similarly, as socialists the Soviets would never admit that they "intervene" in another country's affairs--they have no such "insidious designs." "Nonintervention" is a prescription applied to Western capitalists and means that Western countries should undertake no political or military resistance to the extension of communist revolution.

4. As the above examples show, Soviet propaganda and disinformation tend toward a stylized stereotyping, complete with required epithets. The Soviet government is never said to have "designs," which connote an insidious character and are attributed to the US and the Pentagon. The Soviet regime, on the contrary, always has "plans" which are "creative." In general, these stereotypes and epithets have evolved out of the ideology to connote an indisputable positiveness about Soviet life and an indisputable negativeness about Western life. Interestingly, the negative stereotypes applied to the West often have, in Russian, an archaic flavor--perhaps reflecting the Soviet propagandists' attempt to portray the western world as obsolete and subject to being superseded by the next stage of history.

Semantic Tactics

5. The Soviets have developed a number of conscious and consistently applied tactics in the use of language to give ideological meaning to all concepts and strategies. Because the Soviets believe that language and morality are inseparable--as moral values are dependent on language for realization--they engage in constant repetition of communist terms and constructs in order to condition people's thinking and create feelings of helplessness in the face of (what Soviets perceive and portray as) communist moral superiority.

6. A related tactic that Soviet propagandists use is to alternate individually weak arguments in rapid succession in the hope that they will be convincing cumulatively. One example of this would be the seemingly contradictory arguments about the impermissibility of nuclear war and the winnability of nuclear

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war. The overall effect is to suggest that the Soviets view nuclear war as morally impermissible but physically winnable--once again, putting themselves on the side of the angels.

7. Similarly, the Soviets try to occupy the high ground through an offensive tactic of occupying a position of principled extremeness (the adversary is placed at the opposite extreme). Thus, as the Soviets see themselves occupying the extreme-principled left, the political word "left" must be placed in quotation marks if it refers to an adversary of the Soviet Union.

8. Soviet propagandists try also to anticipate an opposition's objections by framing their own plans in a way to preempt the objections. For example, if greater party control over scientific research is desired but expected to lead to objections from scientists that this will deaden scientific creativity, then the propagandist will anticipate the objection and state that "tighter party control over scientific research is the way to enhance creativity."

9. Another tactic is to try to discredit an adversary in the very characteristic for which he is esteemed. Thus, Soviet propagandists attacked Alexander Ginsburg, the trustee of the Solzhensitzen Fund in the USSR, as a self-dealer and a wastrel, although he was noted for selfless devotion to his trust and a frugal way of life. The history of regime attacks on prominent dissidents in recent years for allegedly self-seeking behavior is replete with examples of this tactic. In the same way, because the US has a worldwide reputation as a rich, free, and peaceful country, Soviet propagandists try to discredit it as not rich but either poor with millions of unemployed or profligate and wasteful, not free but enthralled to this or that oppressor in its society, and not peaceful but bellicose in its international behavior.

Disinformation Ploys

10. A standard tactic in disinformation campaigns involves the language of prejudice or self-deception. As an example of prejudice, if an Asian or African politician becomes too pro-Western, the Soviets will label him as a CIA agent. Although the politician may protest the falsity of the label, a residue of suspicion may remain (so the Soviets hope). In trying to take advantage of self-deception, Soviet active measures play upon the audience's political and cultural biases, sending messages it wants to hear. An example of this might be a campaign to convince the Indians that the CIA was trying to overthrow their government. The campaign might be successful in India, although a similar play could not succeed in, say, Canada, because the

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historical experience of Canadians would tell them, "Nonsense, the Americans would not do this."

11. Most propagandistic disinformation is an act of opportunity intended to promote the long-term interests of the Soviet Union. For example, the Soviets probably were not concerned that their crude forgery of a Ku Klux Klan letter on the Olympics was exposed, because it was not designed for US audiences; rather, it would be likely to have Third World audiences in mind, and a long-term psychological aim may have been achieved.

12. Because active measures serve long-term Soviet purposes, they must be carefully considered and prepared, requiring considerable time in planning. Soviet propagandists and disinformation specialists, however, can and do avail themselves of arguments and debates that are openly aired inside an adversary's society, replaying critical views in an effort to justify Soviet positions to foreign and domestic audiences. During the first few months after they shot down the Korean airliner in 1983, for example, the Soviets collected stories from the Western press that supported their claim that the plane was on a spy mission. Then, for a few months before the first anniversary of the shootdown, anticipating that it would be the subject of renewed Western interest and attacks on the Soviet Union, the regime started a disinformation campaign to claim that the plane was destroyed by a bomb placed on the plane by the CIA in order to destroy evidence of spying and cover tracks. This follows a principle of Soviet rhetoric that parallels the Big Lie and might be called the Bigger and Bigger Lie--trying to show that what is good is growing better faster, and what is bad is growing worse faster. This has been described as the "constant crescendo."

Conclusions

13. The above highlights of the Airlie House conference, which far from exhaust its findings, reveal the organic link between Soviet ideological goals and their consistent, conscious pursuit of a complexly structured, purposeful program of propaganda and disinformation. Despite, however, the verbal attachment to Marxism-Leninism and the use of what may be perceived in the West as ludicrous stereotypes, Soviet propagandists are capable of making rather crude adjustments to the philosophy and argumentation in order to explain discrepancies between theory and practice. In fact, all participants agreed that a hallmark of Soviet propaganda and disinformation is flexibility. This, of course, complicates even more the task of analyzing an already complicated problem.

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
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SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

Further work on this moving target is needed, involving more case studies.

Attachments

14. Attached are two raw transcripts from the conference that deal thoughtfully with these issues in some depth and that you may find particularly interesting. Both are based on formal case studies. The first, at Attachment A, is a discussion of how the Soviets have used disinformation in the arms control arena in an attempt to gain advantages in negotiations with the West. The second, at Attachment B, is an examination of the theme of war danger, which has been used for decades--the danger being played up or played down--both to cloud actual Soviet military intentions and capabilities and, in some cases, to intimidate the West.



Attachments:

- A. Transcript concerning Soviet use of disinformation in the arms control arena
- B. Transcript concerning examination of the theme of war danger

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Discussion on Disinformation

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DDI/SOVA/NIG/[] (9 August 85)

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

85- 3123

5 August 1985

Mr. Aaron Levenstein

STAT

Dear Aaron,

It is remarkable how after over forty years you and I find our minds running on the same track so frequently. I have been thinking about follow-up on the disinformation conference. Leo was down here last week and talked to me about his idea that we need today the modern counterpart of the old Institute for Propaganda Analysis. We talked about how best to develop it. We both agreed that you could make a major contribution. I said I would get in touch with you to get your ideas. Then over the weekend reading a follow-up report on the disinformation conference I found appended to it your letter of 14 February to [redacted] in which you suggest that the purpose of the conference should be to lay the groundwork for a permanent Center for Propaganda Research, paralleling the Institute for Propaganda Analysis of the 1930s.

25X1

So, we are all on the same wavelength. Leo has already talked, I believe, to Freedom House about it. He tells me that Leonard Sussman was involved in the Institute for Propaganda Analysis back in the 1930s.

I'd like you to think about and perhaps talk to Leo about how we can proceed from here. I have already talked to Bob Gates about how we can contribute and he has some ideas. Sometime soon we should all get together and figure out what needs to be done.

It is too bad you were not able to make the conference at Airlie House. Your presence there was missed. We taped the proceedings and are working to prepare a conference report that includes synopses of the numerous oral presentations and discussions, as well as papers presented. We expect this to be given broad dissemination by the State Department.

Yours,


William J. Casey


cc: Mr. Leo Cherne

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505



5 August 1985

Dear Colonel Sleeper,


Thank you for sending a copy of your book and for your very interesting letter about the conference you attended and the subject it addressed.

I think we need to have established somewhere in the Free World an institute which would focus entirely on the tactics and semantics of disinformation and dissemination of analyses and conclusions. There was an organization in New York in the late 30s called The Institute for Propaganda Analysis that did this for what we then called propaganda coming out of Nazi Germany.

I was interested in the book you are developing on Soviet deception with General Schreiver. I attach information, prospectus and outline of a book on a conference on that subject which just crossed my desk.

I wish you well in both endeavors.

Yours,


William J. Casey

Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper

Attachments , ER 85-2814

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IN REPLY REFER TO

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24 July 1985

Honorable William Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C., 20505

W. Casey
The Honorable William Casey:

Since 1979, I have headed an extensive research effort into the theoretical and historical military dimensions of deception and perceptions management at the Naval Postgraduate School. An early product of that effort was a well received book edited by Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, **Strategic Military Deception**, published in 1982.

Since that time the research area has focused more explicitly on problems of Soviet strategic deception and perceptions management both in times of peace and war, thus encompassing aspects of military as well as non-military deception. The thrust of this research has been to go beyond the theoretical exploration of deception to involve the policy-relevant questions of Soviet deception efforts in all areas of East-West interaction. The products of this effort will be published later this Fall in a book entitled **Soviet Strategic Deception**, edited by myself and Professor Brian Dailey.

A conference or workshop will be held at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California on September 26-28, 1985. This conference will provide an opportunity for the contributors to this book to present their research and findings, and to promote discussion of the implications of these findings with other important and knowledgeable individuals inside and outside of government. The conference is being jointly sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.

We would like to extend a cordial invitation to you to attend this important conference. We feel your participation will be important to our success in this effort, and will enhance the relevance and quality of the final product.

Hotel accommodations at the Monterey Sheraton, meals, and air travel will be provided. We would appreciate it if you could please notify the conference coordinator by 10 August regarding your ability to attend.



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Leadership Foundation

July 11, 1985

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Mr. William Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

I want to thank you for the privilege of attending the conference at Airlie House the last week of June on Soviet disinformation, propaganda, and active measures.

I commanded the United States Air Force Foreign Technology Division and was Chief of the Air Force Systems Command Foreign Technology office (technical intelligence), from 1960 to 1967. I saw the tremendous rise of Soviet investment in missiles, space, air craft and all military weapons systems. I also saw the beginning rise of Soviet worldwide active measures operations.

Upon retirement in 1967 I started working on the problem of translation of Marxist-Leninist terminology into truthful English. The result finally was a publication of "A Lexicon Of Marxist-Leninist Semantics" which is a lexicon of Marxist-Leninist concepts. These concepts as you well know, have specific meaning to the Nomenklatura whereas they have a very different, usually diametrically opposite, meaning in the United States and in the West, in general. I am convinced that we must teach our intelligence officers, our diplomats, our foreign service officers, our Voice of America personnel, and even the average American what these concepts are and what they mean.

Stalin wrote a little book called "The Word". In this book he said that "the most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary". Marxist-Leninist leaders worldwide, are indoctrinated in these concepts

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- 2 -

and use them to deceive their enemies. This Semantic deception penetrates our education, penetrates our press and penetrates all of our media. The "People's Democratic Republic of Kampuchea" is a clear example. The Communists killed some two million people in the name of democracy in Cambodia. How preposterous!

Most people in the West still do not know the difference between the "Republic of China" and "The People's Democratic Republic of China". This type of confusion is perpetuated worldwide by our media.

Professor Libor Brom suggested at your conference that a translation facility be established to translate Marxist-Leninist terms into simple English. This is a crucial suggestion. Such a service could easily be established as an adjunct to the FIBIS or the JPRS activities.

Such a service could start at a fairly low level of activity with a few people to translate basic Soviet publications such as Gobachev speeches, lead stories in Pravda, lead stories in Moscow News, etc. These translations should be made available to the leadership echelons in our government but they should also be made available to the media, the universities and the public at large. Properly marketed the service should pay for itself.

There are a dozen or more "dictionaries", "lexicons", and similar publications on interpreting Communeese language. It would be useful to obtain the advice of a group of truly top level semanticists in establishing this service. I'm thinking of men like Professor I.A. Richards of Harvard, (probably deceased by now), Hayakawa--men or women of that stature in the field of semantics.

Someone asked Solzenitsyn how to defeat communism and he replied "tell the truth, tell the truth, tell the truth". When the U.S. Secretary of State is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for engineering a "just peace", (a Communist term for a peace favoring the growth of Communism), there is a burning need for truth.

Your conference was well planned and well run. I sincerely hope you will publish the minutes of the meeting.

But you dare not stop with the publication of the minutes. A follow-on conference is needed to discuss "what can be done" about Soviet disinformation, propaganda, and active measures.

Meanwhile, I am running a study developing a complete book on "Soviet deception". General Bernard A. Schreiver is chairing the study. We would


- 3 -

like to discuss this study with you or such persons as you may designate if you find it of interest.

I have enclosed a copy of my book on Marxist-Leninist Semantics for your personal library.

Congratulations again on giving this vital subject--Soviet deception methods--priority status in your busy schedule.

Sincerely yours,


Col. Raymond S. Sleeper

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Washington, D.C. 20505

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31 JUL 1985

Col. Raymond S. Sleeper, USAF (Ret.)
Vice President, Leadership Foundation

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Dear Col. Sleeper:

Thank you for your letter of July 11 with its positive evaluation of the Airlie House conference on Soviet propaganda and disinformation. Special thanks also for your lexicon on Marxist-Leninist semantics. As you know from my opening remarks at the conference, this subject has been a particular concern of mine for some time, and the more people who are made aware of the problem through efforts like yours, the better for the health of our nation and the West.

You have made several useful suggestions regarding what can be done about Communist disinformation and deception. You can rest assured that we are actively working on this problem. One part of this effort is educational, so we are indeed planning to issue a report on the conference and are considering also a follow-on conference such as you proposed.

As for the study that you and General Schreiver are undertaking on Soviet deception--broadly conceived, I assume--I can only applaud the effort. I would be pleased if you were to contact my National Intelligence Officer for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities, Fred Hutchinson, and discuss it with him. He can be reached on 351-6606.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence



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Letter to Col. Raymond S. Sleeper, Leadership Foundation

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July 11, 1985

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
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Col. Raymond S. Sleeper

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DDI- 03604/85

24 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence §

Director of Soviet Analysis

FROM:
Senior Analyst for National Issues
Office of Soviet Analysis

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference

1. Action required: None. This memorandum, which reports on the outcome of the 25-27 June Conference on Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation (CSPD), is for information only.

Conference Results

2. In practical terms, the conference produced much new evidence on the problem of disinformation, although not as much as hoped for, perhaps, on the semantic dimension per se. Thirteen formal papers were prepared, and approximately 21 hours of discussion exist on tape. Overall, the quality of the papers, oral presentations, and general discussions is quite high--probably the result of the participants' having been informed that some sort of conference proceedings would be published. (How this will be accomplished is discussed below.)

3. As you know, one of the primary purposes of the conference was to highlight the problem that we face in recognizing disinformation's various guises. In this regard, the conference was very successful. The academic papers, especially the case studies, focused attention on specific manifestations of the problem. This forced the audience, as well as the authors, to identify and recognize various forms of disinformation. Perhaps even more useful, however, was the testimony--sometimes written, but more often off-the-cuff--of participating Soviet and East European defectors and emigres, whose accounts of their "hands-on" experience helped considerably to bring home the reality of disinformation's forms and techniques. In fact, the conference was unique in bringing together such a large number of these ex-Soviets with academics and government specialists. This compositional mix produced a good exchange of views and experiences.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference

4. At the same time, the conference produced no consensus on the need for Western scholars to deal directly with the issue of disinformation in their work. Indeed, the conference's final session reflected some marked differences of view among academics on this score. Some argued the need not only to examine closely the "ambiguity and contradictoriness" of Soviet policy, but to take a "moral" position in doing so. Others, while recognizing that disinformation is a significant factor in creating this "ambiguity and contradictoriness," were clearly resistant to this notion, appearing to equate a "moral" position with a "political" one.

5. These differences apparently reflected differing philosophical views as outlined by Norman Podhoretz in his keynote address on the causes of Western vulnerability to semantic manipulation. Despite this, the participants appeared to agree fully on the need for the government to neutralize and counter Soviet disinformation--primarily through greater efforts at consciousness-raising among the media and the public.

Follow-up Steps

6. In organizing the conference, we made clear that some sort of publication would result, and without exception all the conference participants strongly supported this intention. We have considered publishing a simple compilation of the formal papers but decided that too much valuable information and analysis--especially that provided by the defectors--would be lost. We therefore are having the taped proceedings transcribed as quickly as possible in order to prepare a conference report that includes synopses of the numerous oral presentations and discussions. The report will be given broad dissemination by the State Department.

7. A number of the conferees suggested that a list of participants would be useful to keep each other informed and to involve each other in related work as time passes. Some saw this as a first step in helping to create a network of specialists interested in disinformation issues. Accordingly, we have sent such a list (excluding the names of CIA staffers except me) to the conference participants.

8. Another suggestion that many conferees made at the conference and in subsequent correspondence was to have a follow-up conference examine possible countermeasures. A small sample of this correspondence is attached (including an earlier letter from Aaron Levenstein proposing the creation of a privately funded Center for Propaganda Research).

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference

9. We have discussed the idea of a follow-on conference with the NIO/FDIA and the [redacted], who expressed some doubt that academics would have much to contribute to a serious discussion of disinformation countermeasures. If an academic conference were to be held, however, SOVA believes that it should be conducted under the auspices of the State Department, as it would be likely to deal explicitly with issues touching on domestic sensitivities.

STAT

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Attachment:
As stated



SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference

STAT

DDI/SOVA/NIG, (24 July 85)


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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



April 22, 1985

Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick
American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Jeane:

I'd like to take you up on the offer you made last year to contribute to a conference on the semantics of Soviet disinformation. We are in the final stages of organizing the conference, making arrangements with academic specialists on specific aspects of the problem, and expect to have a firm agenda in a couple of weeks. But we can now say definitely that the conference will be held June 25-27 at Airlie House.

Would you do me the honor of delivering the keynote address on the evening of the 25th? It would follow an opening reception at 5:30 and dinner at 6:30, with no other activity scheduled for the evening, so you could speak at whatever length you felt appropriate. I invite you also to join a panel of experts who will evaluate the findings of the conference on the afternoon of the 27th. Please let me know whether your schedule permits, and if this proposal suits you I will put the conference coordinator in touch with more specific details.


William J. Casey



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00618/85/1

12 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Soviet Analysis
FROM:
Senior Analyst for National Issues
Office of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Keynote Address at the Conference on
Semantics of Disinformation

1. Action requested: This memo asks for your approval of the choice of Jeane Kirkpatrick as the keynote speaker at the forthcoming disinformation conference. It is suggested that the letter of invitation come from you (see draft letter at Attachment A) and that you introduce her at the conference.

2. Other persons who have been considered as the keynote speaker include Jean-Francois Revel, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and William Bennett. The overriding considerations in putting Kirkpatrick at the top of the list were, first, a good balance of intelligence, personal experience, and knowledge of the issues, and second, her attraction in terms of media attention. As you will recall, she expressed strong interest in contributing to such a conference when she corresponded with you last year. Under the circumstances it seems appropriate that you introduce her as the keynote speaker at the conference, your schedule permitting.

3. For your information, the conference organization is proceeding well, with a number of first-rate scholars already committed to speak (see Attachment B for a revised agenda

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**SUBJECT: Keynote Address at the Conference on
Semantics of Disinformation**

25X1 - indicating names of those who have already agreed to speak). We
25X1 hope to have firm commitments from all speakers within a couple
of weeks. At that time, we will provide you with the full
program and other relevant details about the conference.

Attachments:

- A. Draft letter of invitation
- B. Revised agenda

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Keynote Address at the Conference on
Semantics of Disinformation

CONCUR:

Director of Soviet Analysis

Date

15 APR 1985

Date

Deputy Director for Intelligence

APPROVAL:

/s/ William J. Casey

19 APR 1985

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

SOVA/NIG/SA [redacted] (12 April 1985)

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A T T A C H M E N T A

D R A F T

Date

Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick
American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C 20036

Dear Jeane:

I'd like to take you up on the offer you made last year to contribute to a conference on the semantics of Soviet disinformation. We are in the final stages of organizing the conference, making arrangements with academic specialists on specific aspects of the problem, and expect to have a firm agenda in a couple of weeks. But we can now say definitely that the conference will be held June 25-27 at Airlie House. Would you do me the honor of delivering the keynote address on the evening of the 25th? It would follow an opening reception at 5:30 and dinner at 6:30, with no other activity scheduled for the evening, so you could speak at whatever length you felt appropriate. I invite you also to join a panel of experts who will evaluate the findings of the conference on the afternoon of the 27th. Please let me know whether your schedule permits, and if this proposal suits you I will put the conference coordinator in touch with more specific details.

William J. Casey

A T T A C H M E N T B

June 26, 1985 (cont.)

(1:00 - 5:15 P.M.) Session II. Case Studies in Soviet Use of Propaganda and Disinformation

1:00 P.M. Colloquium: "Lessons From Soviet Historiography: The Treatment of World War II"

--paper:

2:00 P.M. Colloquium: "The Soviet Defense Burden and the Specter of War"

--paper: Myron Rush, Cornell University

(3:00 - 3:15 P.M.) Break

3:15 P.M. Colloquium: "The Peace Movement in Europe: Manipulation of Popular Perceptions"

--paper: Gerhard Wettig, Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies (Koln, FRG)

4:15 P.M. Colloquium: "The Arms Control Arena: Target on Policy Initiatives"

--paper: David Yost, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey

6:30 P.M. Dinner

(8:00 - 10:00 P.M.) Workshop: Soviet Propaganda Mechanisms

8:00 P.M. Seminar A: "The Media"

Seminar B: "Diplomacy"

Seminar C: "Unofficial Relationships"

9:00 P.M. Plenary Session: Seminar Reports

June 27, 1985

(8:00 - 9:00 A.M.) Session II. Case Studies... (cont.)

8:00 A.M. Colloquium: "National Liberation Movements"

--paper: Roger Kanet, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

June 27, 1985 (cont.)

(9:00 A.M. - 12:00 Noon) Session III. Impact and Effectiveness of Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation

9:00 A.M. Panel: "Coping With the Contradictions"

--paper, "Dissidence":

--paper, "Economic and Social Strains":

--paper, "Afghanistan":

12:00 Noon Luncheon

(1:00 - 3:15 P.M.) Session III. Impact... (cont.)

1:00 P.M. Roundtable: "Moscow's View of Western Vulnerability to Semantic Manipulation"

1:45 P.M. Roundtable: "Moscow's Assessment of Its Own Performance"

2:30 P.M. Roundtable: "Vulnerabilities and Costs to the Soviet System and People"

(3:30 - 5:00 P.M.) Session IV. Conference Findings

3:30 P.M. Panel: "Strengths and Weaknesses of Soviet Use of Propaganda and Disinformation Against Western National Security Interests"

5:00 P.M. Conference closes.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DDI- 00618/85

4 February 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Acting Director of Soviet AnalysisFROM: Senior Analyst, Office of Soviet Analysis,
Policy Analysis DivisionSUBJECT: Results of 24 January Consultation on
the Semantics of Disinformation

1. Action required: Attachment A to this information memorandum presents for your approval a tentative agenda for our planned conference on disinformation. At Attachment B is a similar agenda, containing a first cut at identifying possible speakers, for your comment.

2. Our consultation with outside scholars and State Department officials helped to clarify the important substantive issues for the proposed conference. The attached agenda represents what the CIA members of the consultative group distilled from the ideas raised at the meeting. We are sending this draft agenda to our consultants for their comments and suggestions on speakers for specific topics. (The group's members are listed in Attachment C.)

3. It was clear from the outset that the notions variously described as "semantic pollution," "disinformation," and "propaganda rhetoric" added up to something everyone around the table generally understood and agreed was important, but not to a single concept the group could easily define. The group decided to broaden the focus beyond "disinformation," because it failed to encompass a whole range of important and related issues: how messages impact on different target audiences and why Western audiences are so susceptible to images introduced from the outside and so inarticulate and slack in response; the linkage between language and culture (how rhetoric reflects cultural attitudes and modes of thinking); the historical dimension (how values and meanings attached to words evolve); the international relations context of propaganda; how the nature of modern communications affects the ways in which verbal warfare is waged and perceptions are created and cultivated; and the important underlying role of ideology. By the close of the meeting there was general agreement that the proposed conference should span

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**SUBJECT: Results of 24 January Consultation on the
Semantics of Disinformation**

both the rhetoric of political discourse and the techniques of disinformation. We also agreed that to be manageable and coherent, it should focus on the Soviet Union--the main source of the rhetoric and disinformation with which we are primarily concerned.

4. Dr. Levenstein expressed the view that if the conference is to have tangible impact it should result in policy guidelines for effective counter-efforts. The consensus of the group, however, was that a prescription for counteraction should be reserved for follow-on deliberation and that the proposed conference should pursue the first-step goals of heightening awareness of the problem and elucidating its dimensions. That is a tall order in itself.

5. The group settled tentatively on a title like "Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation" and decided that two days would be a reasonable length for the conference. As Attachment A indicates, we envisage an introductory overview, a discussion of the ideological framework, and a series of case studies that would elucidate various aspects--the historical dimension, the cultural and political contexts, the nature of the Soviet propaganda apparatus, and the rhetorical techniques that are brought into play--as well as a concluding assessment. The case-study approach seems the best way to attack a problem so resistant to precise definition. It was felt that speakers should include Soviet emigres as well as Western scholars.

6. The audience probably should represent a range of disciplines and professions, including journalists, former negotiators, psychologists, semanticists, political scientists, public opinion and marketing people, Kremlinologists, and propaganda analysts. We recognize that more needs to be done in introducing more specialized skills (semanticists, psychologists, etc.) into the list of participants at Attachment B, and are working on this.

7. We will soon be negotiating the administrative aspects of co-sponsorship with the State Department. From a practical point of view, we should probably allow 4-5 months for organizing the composition of the conference and allowing speakers sufficient time to research and prepare papers on their topics. We also plan to put together a reading list in advance of the conference to spur some thinking and enrich the discussion. Meanwhile, we await your comments on the conference design and composition.

25X1

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SUBJECT: Results of 24 January Consultation on the
Semantics of Disinformation

Attachments:

- A. Tentative Agenda
- B. Possible Speakers
- C. Participants in 24 January 1985 Consultation

CONCUR:

25X1

Acting Director of Soviet Analysis

2/4/85
Date

*This looks
to be
excellent
participation*

25X1

Deputy Director for Intelligence

*(hold conference sooner rather
than later)*

2/4/85
Date

APPROVE:

/s/ William J. Casey

Director of Central Intelligence

19 APR 1985

Date

25X1

SOVA/SA/ (4 February 85)

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ATTACHMENT A

Proposal for an Academic Conference

on

"Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation"

-- Tentative Agenda --

INTRODUCTION-- An overview of the nature and dimensions of the problem

I. SEMANTICS AND IDEOLOGY: THEORETICAL APPROACHES

- A. The Relationship of Semantics to Culture and Ideology
- B. The Role of Semantics in Authoritarian and Democratic Societies
- C. The Soviet World-View as the Basis of Thought and Action

II. SOVIET PROPAGANDA GOALS AND THEMES: APPLICATIONS

- A. Updating The Operational Code of the Politburo: The Durability of Soviet Ideology
- B. The Molding of Soviet Self-Images
- C. The Approach to Discourse in International Relations
 - 1. The Concept of Diplomacy and Ideological Struggle
 - 2. Dealing With Friendly Forces
 - 3. Dealing With Adversarial Forces
- D. The Lexicon of Soviet Propaganda: The Connotative Content

III. THE ANATOMY OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA MECHANISMS

- A. The Media
- B. Diplomacy
- C. Unofficial Relationships

IV. CASE STUDIES

- A. Lessons From Soviet Historiography: The Treatment of World War II
- B. The Peace Movement in Europe: Manipulation of Popular Perceptions
- C. The Arms Control Arena: Target on Policy Initiatives
- D. "National Liberation Movements"
- F. The Soviet "Defense Burden" and the Specter of War

V. IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS

- A. How Moscow Rates Its Performance
- B. How Moscow Copes With the Contradictions
 - 1. Dissidence
 - 2. Economic and Social Strains
 - 3. Afghanistan
- C. Vulnerabilities and Costs to the Soviet System and People

ASSESSMENT -- Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet use of propaganda and disinformation against the West's national security interests.

ATTACHMENT B

Proposal for an Academic Conference
on
"Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation"

--Possible Speakers--

INTRODUCTION--An overview of the nature and dimensions of
the problem (1)

1. William J. Casey
2. Jeane Kirkpatrick

STAT

I. SEMANTICS AND IDEOLOGY: THEORETICAL APPROACHES

A. The Relationship of Semantics to Culture and Ideology (1)

- 1.
- 2.

STAT

**B. The Role of Semantics in Authoritarian and Democratic
Societies (1)**

- 1.
- 2.

STAT

C. The Soviet World-View as the Basis of Thought and Action

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

STAT

II. SOVIET PROPAGANDA GOALS AND THEMES: APPLICATIONS

**A. Updating The Operational Code of the Politburo: The
Durability of Soviet Ideology (1)**

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

STAT

B. The Molding of Soviet Self-Images (1)

1.
2.
3.

STAT

C. The Approach to Discourse in International Relations

1. The Concept of Diplomacy and Ideological Struggle (1)

1.
2.
3.
4.

STAT

2. Dealing With Allied Forces (1)

1.
2.

STAT

3. Dealing With Adversarial Forces (1)

1.
2.

STAT

D. The Lexicon of Soviet Propaganda: The Connotative Content (3-4)

1.
2.
3.
4.

STAT

III. THE ANATOMY OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA MACHANISMS

A. The Media (3-4)

1.
2.
3.
4.

STAT

B. Diplomacy (3-4)

1.
2.
3.

STAT

C. Unofficial Relationships (3-4)

1.
2.

STAT

2. Economic and Social Strains (1)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.

STAT

3. Afghanistan (1)

- 1.
- 2.

STAT

C. Vulnerabilities and Costs to the Soviet System and People (1)

- 1.

STAT

ASSESSMENT -- Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet use of propaganda and disinformation against the West's national security interests (3-4)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.

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IV. CASE STUDIES

A. Lessons From Soviet Historiography: The Treatment of World War II (1)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

STAT

B. The Peace Movement in Europe: Manipulation of Popular Perceptions (1)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

STAT

C. The Arms Control Arena: Target on Policy Initiatives (1)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

STAT

D. "National Liberation Movements" (3-4)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

STAT

E. The Soviet "Defense Burden" and the Specter of War (1)

- 1.
- 2.

STAT

V. IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS

A. How Moscow Rates Its Performance (1)

- 1.
- 2.

STAT

B. How Moscow Copes with the Contradictions

1. Dissidence (1)

- 1.
- 2.

STAT

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ATTACHMENT C

Participants in 24 January 1985 Consultation

Academic consultants:

[Redacted]

25X1

State Department:

[Redacted]

25X1

CIA:

25X1

[Redacted]

CRES/FICG

25X1

[Redacted]

FBIS/AG

25X1

[Redacted]

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SUSPENSE		30 Jul 85 <small>Date</small>			

Remarks

To DDI: Please have response prepared for DCI signature.

Executive Secretary

16 Jul 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

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CROSS REF: ER-2493-85

DDI-00618-1/85

PRIOR PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT: NO YES

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Leadership Foundation

July 11, 1985

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Mr. William Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

I want to thank you for the privilege of attending the conference at Airlie House the last week of June on Soviet disinformation, propaganda, and active measures.

I commanded the United States Air Force Foreign Technology Division and was Chief of the Air Force Systems Command Foreign Technology office (technical intelligence), from 1960 to 1967. I saw the tremendous rise of Soviet investment in missiles, space, air craft and all military weapons systems. I also saw the beginning rise of Soviet worldwide active measures operations.

Upon retirement in 1967 I started working on the problem of translation of Marxist-Leninist terminology into truthful English. The result finally was a publication of "A Lexicon Of Marxist-Leninist Semantics" which is a lexicon of Marxist-Leninist concepts. These concepts as you well know, have specific meaning to the Nomenklatura whereas they have a very different, usually diametrically opposite, meaning in the United States and in the West, in general. I am convinced that we must teach our intelligence officers, our diplomats, our foreign service officers, our Voice of America personnel, and even the average American what these concepts are and what they mean.

Stalin wrote a little book called "The Word". In this book he said that "the most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary". Marxist-Leninist leaders worldwide, are indoctrinated in these concepts

7945 Mac Arthur Blvd., Cabin John, Md. 20818

(301) 229-8400



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- 2 -

and use them to deceive their enemies. This Semantic deception penetrates our education, penetrates our press and penetrates all of our media. The "People's Democratic Republic of Kampuchea" is a clear example. The Communists killed some two million people in the name of democracy in Cambodia. How preposterous!

Most people in the West still do not know the difference between the "Republic of China" and "The People's Democratic Republic of China". This type of confusion is perpetuated worldwide by our media.

Professor Libor Brom suggested at your conference that a translation facility be established to translate Marxist-Leninist terms into simple English. This is a crucial suggestion. Such a service could easily be established as an adjunct to the FIBIS or the JPRS activities.

Such a service could start at a fairly low level of activity with a few people to translate basic Soviet publications such as Gorbachev speeches, lead stories in Pravda, lead stories in Moscow News, etc. These translations should be made available to the leadership echelons in our government but they should also be made available to the media, the universities and the public at large. Properly marketed the service should pay for itself.

There are a dozen or more "dictionaries", "lexicons", and similar publications on interpreting Communeese language. It would be useful to obtain the advice of a group of truly top level semanticists in establishing this service. I'm thinking of men like Professor I.A. Richards of Harvard, (probably deceased by now), Hayakawa--men or women of that stature in the field of semantics.

Someone asked Solzenitsyn how to defeat communism and he replied "tell the truth, tell the truth, tell the truth". When the U.S. Secretary of State is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for engineering a "just peace", (a Communist term for a peace favoring the growth of Communism), there is a burning need for truth.

Your conference was well planned and well run. I sincerely hope you will publish the minutes of the meeting.

But you dare not stop with the publication of the minutes. A follow-on conference is needed to discuss "what can be done" about Soviet disinformation, propaganda, and active measures.

Meanwhile, I am running a study developing a complete book on "Soviet deception". General Bernard A. Schreiver is chairing the study. We would


- 3 -

like to discuss this study with you or such persons as you may designate if you find it of interest.

I have enclosed a copy of my book on Marxist-Leninist Semantics for your personal library.

Congratulations again on giving this vital subject--Soviet deception methods--priority status in your busy schedule.

Sincerely yours,



Col. Raymond S. Sleeper

RSS/jeb

Encl.


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ER: .

Please autopen both letters "Bill."
Send the original to the address on the
letter by regular mail.

The copy should be sent to Mr. Podhoretz'
home by FEDERAL EXPRESS as soon as possible,
address below:



Debbie, 21 June

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85-2493

ER

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

21 June 1985

Dear Norm,

Here is the program for the conference which you will keynote at 7:30 p.m. on the evening of June 25th.

I look forward to seeing you at the Eastern Air Lines Shuttle Terminal at National Airport at 5 p.m. on that date.


Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Casey

Enclosure

Mr. Norman Podhoretz
Editor
Commentary
165 East 56th Street
New York, New York 10022

Copy to Mr. Podhoretz at his residence:



Dist: orig-addressee (regular mail)
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B.300

CONFERENCE

ON

"CONTEMPORARY SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION"

--Preliminary Agenda--

June 25, 1985

3:00 P.M. Registration,
 Airlie House, Warrenton, Va.

5:30 P.M. Reception

6:30 P.M. Dinner

7:30 P.M. Keynote Address

June 26, 1985

(8:00 A.M. - Session I. The Semantics of Soviet Propaganda and
12:00 Noon) Disinformation: Themes and Goals--Chair,
 [redacted] University of Virginia

STAT

8:00 A.M. Roundtable: "The Lexicon of Soviet Propaganda:
 Its Connotative Content"

--Moderator: [redacted]
 Ohio State University

STAT

--Panelists:
 :

STAT

9:00 A.M. Colloquium: "The Operational Code of the Politburo
 Revisited: Soviet Ideology Today"

--Paper: [redacted]
 University of California, Berkeley

STAT

--Commentator: [redacted]
 Department of State

STAT

(10:00 - Break
10:15 A.M.)

10:15 A.M. Panel: "The Soviet Approach to Discourse in
 International Relations"

June 26, 1985 (cont.)

--Paper, "Setting the General Terms of Reference":
 [] The Kennan Institute for
 Advanced Russian Studies STAT

--Paper, "Dealing With Friendly Forces": [] STAT
 Ohio State University

--Paper, "Dealing with Adversarial Forces": TBA

--Commentator: [] STAT
 Yale University

12:00 Noon Luncheon

(1:00 - 5:15 P.M.) Session II. Case Studies in Soviet Use of Propaganda and Disinformation--Chair,
 [] University of California at Berkeley STAT

1:00 P.M. Roundtable: "The Treatment of the History of World War II in the Baltics"

--Paper: [] Yale University STAT

--Panelists: [] Florida State University STAT
 : [] Russian Research Cent STAT
 Harvard University

2:00 P.M. Colloquium: "The Soviet Defense Burden and the Specter of War"

--Paper: [] Cornell University STAT

--Commentator: [] Princeton University STAT

(3:00 - 3:15 P.M.) Break

3:15 P.M. Colloquium: "The Peace Movement in Europe: Manipulation of Popular Perceptions"

--Paper: [] Federal Institute for
 Eastern and International Studies (Koln, FRG) STAT

--Commentator: John Van Oudenaren,
 The Rand Corporation

4:15 P.M. Colloquium: "The Arms Control Arena: Target on Policy Initiatives"

--Paper: Stanley Kober, Center for Naval Analyses

--Commentator: TBA

June 26, 1985 (cont.)

6:30 P.M. Dinner

(8:00 - Workshop: Soviet Propaganda Channels--Chair,
10:00 P.M.) [redacted] University of New Brunswick STAT

8:00 P.M. Seminar A: "Propaganda and the Media"

--Leader: [redacted] STAT
Emory University

Seminar B: "Propaganda and Diplomacy"

--Leader: Malcolm Toon,
retired U.S. Ambassador

Seminar C: "Propaganda and Unofficial
Relationships"

--Leader: [redacted] STAT
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

9:00 P.M. Plenary Session: Seminar Reports

June 27, 1985

(9:00 - Session II. Case Studies... (cont.)
10:00 A.M.)

9:00 A.M. Colloquium: "National Liberation Movements"

--Paper: [redacted] University of Illinois, STAT
Urbana-Champaign

--Commentator: David Albright, Air War College

(10:00 - Break
10:15 A.M.)

(10:15 A.M. - Session III. Impact of Domestic Sensitivities on
12:00 Noon) Soviet External Propaganda and Disinformation--
Chair, [redacted] STAT

10:15 A.M. Panel: "Coping With the Contradictions"

--Paper, "Dissidence": [redacted] STAT
London School of Economics and Political Science

--Paper, "Religion": [redacted] STAT
The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian
Studies

--Paper, "Emigres": [redacted] STAT
University of Maryland

June 27, 1985 (cont.)

--Paper, "Afghanistan": Zalmay Khalilzad,
Columbia University

--Commentator: [redacted]

The Hoover Institution

STAT

12:00 Noon

Luncheon

(1:00 -
3:00 P.M.)

Session III. Impact... (cont.)

1:00 P.M.

Roundtable: "Moscow's View of Its Own Performance and
of Western Vulnerability to Semantic Manipulation"

--Moderator: [redacted]

University of Vermont

STAT

--Panelists: [redacted]

Michigan State University

STAT

:

[redacted]
Research Institute for Contemporary
Soviet Affairs (Munich, FRG)

STAT

2:00 P.M.

Roundtable: "Domestic Backlash: National
Misperceptions and Policy Distortions"

--Moderator: [redacted]

Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy

STAT

--Panelists: [redacted]

:

The Rand Corporation
TBA

STAT

(3:00 -
3:15 P.M.)

Break

(3:15 -
5:00 P.M.)

Session IV. 'Conference Findings

3:15 P.M.

Roundtable: "Strengths and Weaknesses of Soviet Use of
Propaganda and Disinformation Against Western National
Security Interests"

--Moderator: [redacted]

, Jr.,
Editor, Problems of Communism

STAT

--Panelists: [redacted]

STAT

5:00 P.M.

Conference closes.



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Follow-up to the Disinformation Conference

FROM:

Senior Analyst, Nat'l Issues

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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12 Aug 85

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This should be filed under the following:

8.

DISINFORMATION

9.

DISINFORMATION CONFERENCE

10.

ACTIVE MEASURES

TW

11.

It is important to keep
this for the DCI's future
reference.

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1-1

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: NORMAN PODHORETZ,
EDITOR, "COMMENTARY"

INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM J. CASEY, DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

STAT

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STAT

[redacted] -- assembled talents in one room at one time, and I'd like to thank you all for coming, for contributing to making this conference a success at the start.

For those of you who don't know me, I'm [redacted] [redacted] the conference coordinator. I'm the person you look to when you have a problem, or if you want to blame or criticize me for something. I'll try to do whatever I can to alleviate the problem. But I'm not up here to do anything more than to introduce tonight's honored guest, and I'll do that without any further ado, because we're a little bit behind our schedule.

Mr. William J. Casey needs no introduction, so let me turn the mike over to him and allow him to introduce the keynote speaker. Thank you. (Applause.)

DIRECTOR CASEY: Thank you. I'm very pleased to welcome you to this conference tonight, which we are co-sponsoring with the Department of State. A successful conference depends on the talents, experience, and the insights of the participants. I want to thank [redacted]

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[redacted] who

1-2

has organized this conference, who worked tirelessly to put together such a fine program. I'm very impressed with the caliber of the participants and conferrees assembled here, and I eagerly look forward to hearing your perspectives on Soviet propaganda and disinformation today.

The genesis of this undertaking was a concern that I felt, I guess, about the success that the Soviets were having in deploying SS-20 missiles and at the same time making the United States a threat to the peace in Europe. Their success earlier, in causing us not to deploy the neutron weapon, through a very effective disinformation, active measures, campaign, and the perception that they were warming up and getting started on a comparable effort against the Strategic Defense Initiative.

I recall, back in the days immediately before World War II, when Hitler was doing so well with the technique of the "big lie". There was an organization called The Institute for Propaganda Analysis. The people I recall as having been associated with it were Paul Lazarfeld (?) and Harold Laswell (?), Quincy Howe, at that time a columnist -- these were professors, academics, in the field of communications and psychology.

I talked to some people who have memories of

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those days, Leo Chern, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Pat Moynihan, Fred Ikle, and Fred Ikle had coined, had used, the word, "semantic pollution". Pat Moynihan has spoken to this using the term "semantic infiltration". And I felt this was something you ought to take a look at from an intelligence standpoint. That really is the genesis of this conference.

I think that no nation in history is better mastered at using the art and science of disinformation and propaganda than the Soviet Union. Certainly the Soviets have truly augmented their leverage in foreign affairs and in their policy, their power to influence other nations and many groups, their their enormous investment in propaganda and disinformation, and through their skillful use of these elements.

We know a great deal about the propaganda process, how it works, how the Soviets rely on it and use it, and we in the west have only recently begun to study systematically the role that disinformation plays in that process, and really active measures in disinformation have only recently been a significant intelligence objective, trying to understand it and understand where and how it's used.

I believe that we must examine semantics and propaganda much more carefully than we have in the past.

1-4

Even in the world of intelligence and diplomacy disinformation, semantic twisting, has not been sufficiently recognized as the efficient weapon it is. We've seen it used as a weapon in the enhanced radiation fight, the INF fight, and now again in the SDI fight. And it's clear, as these examples illustrate, that the Soviets place great emphasis on these weapons in influencing nations' national security decisions taken in the West. They play it against our media, play it against our Congress, and so on. And against our allies, to divide us from our allies.

Also, this technique of disinformation and semantic pollution, whatever you want to call it, can confuse us in our policy orientation. Right now there's a question as to whether the current terrorism crisis is strictly the reaction of terrorists, all of the activities of terrorist, with a quasi-religious orientation, or an aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or part of their much broader strategic thrust in which the Soviet Union uses Moslems in the Middle East and in the Philippines, the Catholic liberation forces in Central America and again in the Philippines, and it seems to me that a proper understanding of the role of proper language and concepts in dealing with these issues makes a great difference in the validity and the effectiveness of our policy responses.

In fact, if we don't understand disinformation,

1-5

propaganda that's thrown at us, and if we're deluded by it ourselves, it can twist our policies and distort our policies, and confuse us in our policies. We need to look at the Soviet fanning of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet reaction to the current one. We need to assess the disinformation thrusts accurately in order to detect and expose them, in order to rebut them, and in order to avoid false assessments in our own policy deliberations and orientation.

And it's only through the concerted effort of all of us that we can achieve this.

You at this conference, by focusing on the largely unexplored questions and issues involving the structure and semantics of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, can help raise the level of our understanding and the problems that significantly affect our national security and the general well-being of western democracies.

And we're lucky in the selection of our keynote speaker. There are few who understand or are able to articulate the political issues involved in the struggle to preserve our democratic heritage and values than tonight's keynote speaker, Norman Podhoretz. As the editor of "Commentary" he has posed these issues before us and provoked us to give them careful consideration. His personal story, the story of his infatuation and

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and later disillusionment with what used to be labor-liberal values in the late 1960s, is best told by himself in his two autobiographical works, "Making It", and "Breaking Ranks".

More recent books that Norman wrote, or had published, were titled, "Why We Were in Vietnam", and the second one, called, "The Present Danger," with the subtitle, "Can We Reverse The Decline of American Power?"

In addition to being a magazine editor and author of books, he is now a syndicated columnist. And to establish that this conference is totally non-political and open to a wide range of opinions. I will note that his latest column is called, "Reagan, The Crippled Hawk". (Laughter.)

Norman Podheretz. (Applause.)

MR. PODHERETZ: Thank you, Bill.

I, in looking at the program for this conference, in trying to decide what I could most usefully contribute to these deliberations by way of a keynote address, I thought that it would be best if I undertook not to talk about Soviet propaganda and disinformation in themselves, since that is what you will all be talking about in great detail and with great expertise in the next couple of days, but rather, about the reasons for the vulnerability of the western democracies and including, of course, the United

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12 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence *8*
Director of Soviet Analysis *Q/M*

FROM:
Senior Analyst for National Issues
Office of Soviet Analysis

SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

1. Action required: None. This memorandum presents for your information some preliminary results on the structure of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, as gleaned from the first several hundred pages of transcripts from the Airlie House conference. We estimate that the transcription of the entire proceedings, when completed, will comprise about 800 pages. In addition, the 13 formal papers total almost 500 pages. As I believe you are aware, we intend to synopsise the conference proceedings in a conference report that will include the formal papers. The State Department will publish and disseminate the final product.

Ideology and Language

2. It was clear from the conference discussion that Marxist-Leninist theory determines the semantic structure of Soviet propaganda and disinformation. The Soviet world view relates all human activities to world revolution. In Soviet thinking, everything that promotes this process is good, right, and true, while everything that hampers it is bad, wrong, and false. The dichotomy between Soviet "socialism" and Western "capitalism" results in numerous stereotypes in Soviet discourse and rules out certain others. For example, "Soviet imperialism" is literally nonsense in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology, inasmuch as the term "imperialism" is defined as a particular stage of capitalism. Therefore, to the extent that these terms

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SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

of reference are accepted by an audience, actual Soviet imperial behavior is unthinkable, a contradiction in terms.

3. Two major campaigns in recent years illustrate how the Soviet ideology sets the terms of international discourse. The first is the so-called peace program, and the second is foreign "nonintervention." Soviet socialism is, by definition of the ideology, opposed to war and in favor of peace; only Western capitalists and imperialists are "warmongers." Thus, to be for the peace program means to be in favor of disarming the warmongering opposition. Similarly, as socialists the Soviets would never admit that they "intervene" in another country's affairs--they have no such "insidious designs." "Nonintervention" is a prescription applied to Western capitalists and means that Western countries should undertake no political or military resistance to the extension of communist revolution.

4. As the above examples show, Soviet propaganda and disinformation tend toward a stylized stereotyping, complete with required epithets. The Soviet government is never said to have "designs," which connote an insidious character and are attributed to the US and the Pentagon. The Soviet regime, on the contrary, always has "plans" which are "creative." In general, these stereotypes and epithets have evolved out of the ideology to connote an indisputable positiveness about Soviet life and an indisputable negativeness about Western life. Interestingly, the negative stereotypes applied to the West often have, in Russian, an archaic flavor--perhaps reflecting the Soviet propagandists' attempt to portray the western world as obsolete and subject to being superseded by the next stage of history.

Semantic Tactics

5. The Soviets have developed a number of conscious and consistently applied tactics in the use of language to give ideological meaning to all concepts and strategies. Because the Soviets believe that language and morality are inseparable--as moral values are dependent on language for realization--they engage in constant repetition of communist terms and constructs in order to condition people's thinking and create feelings of helplessness in the face of (what Soviets perceive and portray as) communist moral superiority.

6. A related tactic that Soviet propagandists use is to alternate individually weak arguments in rapid succession in the hope that they will be convincing cumulatively. One example of this would be the seemingly contradictory arguments about the impermissibility of nuclear war and the winnability of nuclear

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SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

war. The overall effect is to suggest that the Soviets view nuclear war as morally impermissible but physically winnable--once again, putting themselves on the side of the angels.

7. Similarly, the Soviets try to occupy the high ground through an offensive tactic of occupying a position of principled extremeness (the adversary is placed at the opposite extreme). Thus, as the Soviets see themselves occupying the extreme-principled left, the political word "left" must be placed in quotation marks if it refers to an adversary of the Soviet Union.

8. Soviet propagandists try also to anticipate an opposition's objections by framing their own plans in a way to preempt the objections. For example, if greater party control over scientific research is desired but expected to lead to objections from scientists that this will deaden scientific creativity, then the propagandist will anticipate the objection and state that "tighter party control over scientific research is the way to enhance creativity."

9. Another tactic is to try to discredit an adversary in the very characteristic for which he is esteemed. Thus, Soviet propagandists attacked Alexander Ginsburg, the trustee of the Solzhensitzen Fund in the USSR, as a self-dealer and a wastrel, although he was noted for selfless devotion to his trust and a frugal way of life. The history of regime attacks on prominent dissidents in recent years for allegedly self-seeking behavior is replete with examples of this tactic. In the same way, because the US has a worldwide reputation as a rich, free, and peaceful country, Soviet propagandists try to discredit it as not rich but either poor with millions of unemployed or profligate and wasteful, not free but enthralled to this or that oppressor in its society, and not peaceful but bellicose in its international behavior.

Disinformation Ploys

10. A standard tactic in disinformation campaigns involves the language of prejudice or self-deception. As an example of prejudice, if an Asian or African politician becomes too pro-Western, the Soviets will label him as a CIA agent. Although the politician may protest the falsity of the label, a residue of suspicion may remain (so the Soviets hope). In trying to take advantage of self-deception, Soviet active measures play upon the audience's political and cultural biases, sending messages it wants to hear. An example of this might be a campaign to convince the Indians that the CIA was trying to overthrow their government. The campaign might be successful in India, although a similar ploy could not succeed in, say, Canada, because the

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SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

historical experience of Canadians would tell them, "Nonsense, the Americans would not do this."

11. Most propagandistic disinformation is an act of opportunity intended to promote the long-term interests of the Soviet Union. For example, the Soviets probably were not concerned that their crude forgery of a Ku Klux Klan letter on the Olympics was exposed, because it was not designed for US audiences; rather, it would be likely to have Third World audiences in mind, and a long-term psychological aim may have been achieved.

12. Because active measures serve long-term Soviet purposes, they must be carefully considered and prepared, requiring considerable time in planning. Soviet propagandists and disinformation specialists, however, can and do avail themselves of arguments and debates that are openly aired inside an adversary's society, replaying critical views in an effort to justify Soviet positions to foreign and domestic audiences. During the first few months after they shot down the Korean airliner in 1983, for example, the Soviets collected stories from the Western press that supported their claim that the plane was on a spy mission. Then, for a few months before the first anniversary of the shootdown, anticipating that it would be the subject of renewed Western interest and attacks on the Soviet Union, the regime started a disinformation campaign to claim that the plane was destroyed by a bomb placed on the plane by the CIA in order to destroy evidence of spying and cover tracks. This follows a principle of Soviet rhetoric that parallels the Big Lie and might be called the Bigger and Bigger Lie--trying to show that what is good is growing better faster, and what is bad is growing worse faster. This has been described as the "constant crescendo."

Conclusions

13. The above highlights of the Airlie House conference, which far from exhaust its findings, reveal the organic link between Soviet ideological goals and their consistent, conscious pursuit of a complexly structured, purposeful program of propaganda and disinformation. Despite, however, the verbal attachment to Marxism-Leninism and the use of what may be perceived in the West as ludicrous stereotypes, Soviet propagandists are capable of making rather crude adjustments to the philosophy and argumentation in order to explain discrepancies between theory and practice. In fact, all participants agreed that a hallmark of Soviet propaganda and disinformation is flexibility. This, of course, complicates even more the task of analyzing an already complicated problem.

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
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SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

Further work on this moving target is needed, involving more case studies.

Attachments

14. Attached are two raw transcripts from the conference that deal thoughtfully with these issues in some depth and that you may find particularly interesting. Both are based on formal case studies. The first, at Attachment A, is a discussion of how the Soviets have used disinformation in the arms control arena in an attempt to gain advantages in negotiations with the West. The second, at Attachment B, is an examination of the theme of war danger, which has been used for decades--the danger being played up or played down--both to cloud actual Soviet military intentions and capabilities and, in some cases, to intimidate the West.



Attachments:

- A. Transcript concerning Soviet use of disinformation in the arms control arena
- B. Transcript concerning examination of the theme of war danger

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SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation

25X1

DDI/SOVA/NIG (9 August 85)

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COLOQUIUM: "THE ARMS CONTROL ARENA: TARGET ON POLICY
INITIATIVES

 Thank you very much. I think with^{25X1}
that we'll have to thank our panel and proceed, in our
remaining time, to our last home destination, namely 5:30.
Thank you very much, both of you.

Disinformation and propaganda in the arena of
arms control, and our paper is being delivered in some form,
an informal form, I believe, by Stan Kober from the Center
for Naval Analyses.

 Thank you, Paul. You should all have^{25X1}
copies of the paper. So, if you can follow through. They

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were available this morning. And I will go through it very quickly.

In 1971, at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev launched a peace offensive. This was the initiation of detente, and Brezhnev later defined detente as, quote, "a readiness to resolve differences and arguments not by force, not by threats or saber-rattling, but by peaceful means at the conference table. Detente is a certain trust and a certain responsibility to take into account the legitimate interests of one another."

At the same time Brezhnev spoke these words, however, other Soviet officials were defining negotiations differently. For example, in 1968 Colonel Yiftin Yuriftin (?) wrote about disarmament in the General Communist of the Armed Forces, "It is impossible to agree that disarmament may be realized as a result of calm discussions. Disarmament cannot be the result of some kind of utopian calming of the class political struggle in the international arena. It can be achieved only as a result of the most active pressure on their governments by the revolutionary forces in the imperialist countries, in conjunction with a flexible and principled policy by the socialist camp. Any other notion of the past for achieving disarmament is an illusion."

More recently, these sentiments were echoed by

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Georgi Arbatov, who is widely regarded as a Kremlin moderate. "You know," he said, "with all due respect to those holding the talks in Geneva, we still have to say that their efforts are not sufficient to change policy itself and political realities. The efforts of both negotiators and diplomats can be effective only in conditions where the political struggle sufficiently creates serious changes in the international situation, in the international climate, the nature of the policies of states and so on."

In short, in contrast to Brezhnev's noble sentiments, the Soviet aim in negotiations not based on a desire to take into account the legitimate interests of one another but is, rather, designed to achieve the best deal for the Soviet Union Moscow thinks it can get. The negotiations are not, as John Newhouse calls them, "the grand negotiation", thinking of the Congress of Vienna. They are, as a Soviet negotiator might say, "an oriental bazaar". That's how one of them described it in frustration to Ed Rowney, who complained that Soviet negotiating positions were unreasonable. The guy said, "You just don't understand. Have you ever tried to buy a rug from a Persian?" That's more the Soviet understanding of the negotiations.

So, if the Soviets, then, view arms control in

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that manner, they are more hypocritical about the means by which they seek to accomplish their objective. Whereas they suppress Andrei Sakharov and other peace advocates who don't follow the party line, they openly proclaim their negotiating strategy is based on the pressure western political movement can put on their own governments for concessions. As Arbatov observed two years ago, "This Reagan administration can only do something different under pressure. What pressure? Under the pressure of economic, political, and objective factors," "objective factors" meaning the military correlation of forces, presumably, "and the pressure from its own public opinion and its allies."

The depth of the Kremlin's cynicism can be gleaned from a Soviet text published in 1972, the year the SALT I agreements were signed. In preparing for the Genoa conference, this book said, Lenin wrote in a draft central committee directive for the Soviet delegation that they should approach the bourgeois pacifist slogan in a sober manner. "Both you and I," Lenin reminded Chichurin (?), "have fought against pacifism as a program for the revolutionary proletarian party. This is obvious. But where, when, and who deny utilize of pacifists by this party in order to demoralize the enemy, the bourgeoisie."

And the '72 book went on to comment, "This

7-25

comment is of enormous significance in defining the tactics of communist parties in the struggle for peace and socialism," and on and on.

In other words, Moscow's policy is not based on a genuine desire to resolve differences but, rather, on the manipulation of the emotions of people in the western democracies. By building up its own nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union inspires fear about the future and the expectation that people will attempt to release their anxiety by demanding that their government do something to end the arms race and reach an accommodation with Moscow.

I have a long quotation on that on page four. I won't go through that. You can read it yourselves.

If the Soviet military buildup inspires fear, though, it cannot, by itself, channel that fear in the proper direction. For that a peace offensive is necessary, since, quote, "The political and propaganda significance of Soviet proposals and peace initiatives is indisputable." That's an important article from Eshaya (?) this year. He's not talking about the stabilizing effects or something like that. It's the political and propaganda significance of these peace proposals.

In the words of Boris Kanymayrov (?), "The cause of peace requires an approach from both ends, from above, through diplomatic efforts by peace-loving states, and

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from below, from a mass anti-war movement." It is in this context that Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Party Congress, the arms control proposals that flowed from it must be judged.

I now want to go through some of the history of the various important negotiations and arms control initiatives, beginning with strategic offensive arms. The Soviets have attempted to claim that they want an agreement on MIRVs, multiple, independently-targetable, re-entry vehicles. A statement to this effect was made in "New Times" in 1979. One can understand why they like to claim that, since it is generally agreed now that MIRVs are highly destabilizing and we'd like to get away from them.

Yet, despite this claim, the record indicates that it was the United States and not the Soviet Union that first tabled a proposal on limiting MIRVs, at SALT. According to John Newhouse's account called "DORN", quote, "The Russians never mentioned MIRV themselves. When in April, 1970 the US proposed a total ban on MIRVs, along with on-site inspection, the Soviets promptly rejected it. Instead, Moscow proposed that testing of MIRVs should be permitted, but deployment and production should be prohibited. This proposal was not regarded as serious, for in the absence of on-site inspection MIRVs can be produced and deployed secretly, after they have been tested."

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Shortly after the United States rejected Moscow's counter-offer, the Soviets indicated to the American delegation that they were not seriously interested in including MIRVs in SALT I. As the chief US (Soviet?) negotiator, Vladimir Simyonev (?) told our chief negotiator, Gerard Smith, and Smith recounts this in his memoirs, "On June 9, 1970, Simyonev privately questioned whether reductions in MIRV control would not be premature and complicate an initial agreement. Was he suggesting that a first agreement omit a MIRV ban or reductions? He seemed to think so and mentioned the difficulty of MIRV verification. He remarked that, quote, 'Both sides had spoken about MIRVs', unquote, in a way that implied our duty had now been done. It seemed clear that the Soviet preference was for a limited initial agreement not banning MIRVs. Soviet officials commented to this effect."

In short, far from taking the initiative on prohibiting MIRVs, the Soviets, by their negotiating behavior, indicated a desire to see MIRVs deployed. And one can understand why.

The same is true of Cruise missiles. Although they have made a big fuss about that since we had a breakthrough on Cruise missiles in the mid-1970s, it should be recognized, according to Paul Nitze's testimony in 1972, quote, "It was then, in SALT I, our position, the

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US position, that Cruise missiles should also be included in the SALT I Treaty. The Soviets objected to the inclusion of Cruise missiles." Ray Gartsoff (?) has also confirmed that.

But perhaps the most outrageous misrepresentation of the strategic arms negotiation occurred last year. In an interview on the "Today Show" on September 10th, 1984, Marshal Sergei Arkonayev (?), newly-appointed chief of the General Staff, told his American audience that, quote, "The US delegation in START insisted on leaving aside, outside the framework of the negotiations, US strategic bombers," unquote, because the US did not want to limit itself in an area in which it had an advantage. This was a flagrant lie. As Arkonayev undoubtedly was aware, a year earlier the United States had proposed to limit its bombers in exchange for limits on Soviet land-based ballistic missiles, the area of Moscow's greatest advantage.

This "tradeoff proposal", as it's been called, was promptly rejected by the Soviet Union. In the words of Pravda which, of all places, first revealed the existence of the American offer, "In putting forward one-sided offers that are to the advantage of the United States with regard to both ballistic missiles and bombers, Washington is cynically offering to exchange the Soviet advantage in missiles for the American superiority in

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bombers. That is an empty gesture. After all, what is in question is nothing other than an offer to write off B-52 bombers that are mothballed in the reserve and are, in any case, already objectively liable to replacement. And, in exchange, the Soviet Union would have to reduce its modern ICBMs that are deployed in positions. That may be cunningly conceived, but it is designed for fools."

In short, whereas Arkonayev accused the United States of -- on American television, yet -- of being unwilling to consider limitations on bombers, because of its advantage in this area, in fact the United States did propose to limit bombers, but the USSR rejected the proposal because it considered its new ICBMs too good to trade for old American bombers.

Arkonayev's egregious distortion of the negotiating record is, in my opinion, an outstanding example of official Soviet disinformation.

Turning to the INF talks, there are three instances of disinformation that I select. The first I just took right out of The Economist of Lond, which cited a paper, a Soviet paper, presented by General Chervov (?) of the Soviet General Staff in 1981, claiming that NATO possessed 1,031 delivery systems, INF systems, against 1,055 for the Pact, thereby alleging some sort of parity.

Among the distortions noted by The Economist,

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the Soviets included American F-4s but not Soviet fighter-bombers with equal or greater range. They included Pershing I missiles but not their own longer-range missiles, and so on and so forth.

After correcting for these and other errors, The Economist concluded that NATO had 864 INF systems against 2,441 for the Pact.

A second piece of disinformation involves the range of the Pershing II missile. According to NATO sources the P-2 has a range of 1,800 kilometers, which means it cannot reach Moscow. This is important, because the Soviets have claimed that the P-2 represents decapitating ability, that it can, in five minutes, decapitate the Soviet leadership. In order to do that it has to reach Moscow.

Evidently realizing the political advantages to be gained from attributing such range to the P-2, Soviet spokesmen increased its range so it could cover Moscow. Defense Minister Ustinov himself claiming in July, 1981 these missiles had a range of 2,500 kilometers. It appears that Soviet specialists do not believe this figure, because in the professional journal, "Foreign Military Review", which is used to describe western weapons systems to Soviet officers, in October, '81, that is, after Ustinov's remark, the range of the Pershing II is accurately reported,

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1,800 kilometers.

But perhaps the most serious example of Soviet disinformation, however, concerns the proposal to reduce the number of Soviet warheads and missiles so they would equal the British and French totals. This involves confusing the M-I-R-V warheads, on the SS-20s, with the M-R-V warheads on the British Polaris missiles. This inequity was pointed out by Alexander Bolvina (?), a Soviet journalist, in a 1983 visit to Greece.

"The SS-20s have three warheads," Bolvina said. "The French missiles have one warhead. The British Polaris missiles have three warheads, but all destined for one target. They are not aimed at multiple targets at the same time, and in this sense we agree that for each of our missiles the other side should have three."

Intrigued by Bolvina's offer, Paul Nitze, US Chief Negotiator, pursued the matter at the INF talks. His efforts met with no success. Moscow told him that they had no intention of making such large reductions in their missile force.

Thus, unless Bolvina was speaking completely without authorization, his remarks must be regarded as an exercise in disinformation, designed to affect the political situation in Greece. At the very least, by acknowledging the unfairness of the official Soviet

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he exposed the Kremlin's manipulation of popular ignorance concerning technical military matters.

MBFR: The problem with MBFR has been the data-base problem, disagreements about the size of Warsaw Pact forces. The point of dispute apparently concerns the status of some Pact support troops. In the words of a Soviet spokesman -- I won't quote the words here, they're on page 13 -- but evidently they have everybody in uniform and we have some contractors who aren't in uniform that do the services that their people in uniform do and it's unfair to count their people in uniform in the totals.

This was stated in '79.

This explanation, however, contradicts the assurances given by the Soviet government in 1976, when it first revealed its totals. According to TASS, the Soviet government, quote, "presented figures concerning the total numerical strength of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact." Thus, the Soviet statements are at odds with each other, despite official claims that the original figures comprised the total strength of the Pact forces. They evidently did not, judging from the subsequent explanation.

When challenged on the discrepancy, the Pact effectively confessed that its original figures were incomplete. But in explaining the reason for the discrepancy they neglected to mention its earlier

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assurance. Presumably Pact officials, forced to make the best of a bad situation, simply hoped their NATO counterparts could prove to have short memories. With this kind of an attitude it's not surprising these negotiations have made such little progress.

On strategic defense, it is well known that the Soviets are complaining about the US strategic defense program. What is not as well known is that they were talking, before the President's March, 1983 speech, of "Protecting the rear from aerial attack is becoming one of the most important tasks of war," The Director of Soviet Civil Defense, General Alexander Altunin (?), wrote in 1980. "The modern means and methods of armed conflict have produced an urgent need for creating a system which would ensure protection of the rear from the air over our country's entire territory."

Indeed, even while they criticized the US program, Soviet spokesmen take it for granted that the Soviet government should try to protect its own people against nuclear attack. "To save just one percent of the Soviet population would mean to save just 3 million people," Lev Someko (?), military affairs specialist, explained just last year. "No one in this country would understand the government if it failed to strive for this."

Anxious to stop the American program, Soviet

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officials initially insisted strategic defense was so important it had to be discussed by itself. And American efforts to link discussion of defensive with offensive weapons were condemned in uncompromising language.

To cite Someko again, quote, "Space is an independent problem, and to link the question of preventing its militarization to the question of nuclear armaments is a red herring and a waste of time." The United States stood firm, however, and the Soviet government yielded, agreeing in January, 1985, to conduct negotiations on offensive and defensive weapons simultaneously in one negotiating forum. Not being ones to bear a grudge, or one suspects, expose a retreat, Soviet spokesmen promptly reversed field and explained that, quote, "It was only as a result of persistent hard work by the Soviet side that the US delegation finally had to adopt the viewpoint that questions relating to space and nuclear armaments are inseparable and must be discussed and solved together." (Laughs.)

No first use: This has been a very popular Soviet proposal, no first use of nuclear weapons. Three comments on that. First of all, their position is based on a misrepresentation of NATO policy. They argue that since NATO does not adopt a policy of no first use, it intends to use nuclear weapons first.

On the contrary, NATO has no desire to use

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nuclear weapons early or first, but recognizing that uncertainty about the chances of success restrains military aggression, it refuses to make the job of an attacker easier by limiting its options.

This leads to the second point. The Soviets are seeking a legal bar to the initiation of aggression, if that's the purpose of "no first use", that already exists in the UN Charter. As a signatory of the Charter, the United States has already pledged not to use any weapons, including nuclear weapons, first.

When confronted on this point, however, Soviet spokesmen are unimpressed. In the words of a Soviet journalist, "Let us look at everything through the eyes of the unsophisticated, or as you say here, the man in the street. Here you have two powerful military/political groupings, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The UN Charter is just a charter, whereas if the custodians of military strength in the West and the East sign a non-aggression treaty, this commitment would acquire an entirely new quality, would it not?"

In other words, the Soviet proposal is designed entirely for propaganda purposes, not to diminish the risk of war, but to influence the perception of the man in the street. This brings into question the sincerity of the Soviet pledge, especially if the importance of the Charter

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can be so casually dismissed.

These doubts are reinforced by Soviet military publications that appeared following the promulgation of the "no first use" pledge. Some of these materials make no acknowledgement of the "no first use" pledge, but to cite one which appeared several months after the pledge was given, quote, "At the present time the course and sometimes the outcome of the meeting engagement will depend to a great degree on which of the sides delivers the nuclear strike first. Consequently, timely maneuver by nuclear means is the basis of maneuver in the meeting engagement."

I find that difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of "no first use".

In conclusion I'd like to quote Josef Stalin, who once said, "With a diplomat words must diverge from acts. What kind of diplomat would he otherwise be? Words are one thing and acts something different. Good words are masks for bad deeds. A sincere diplomat would equal dry water, wooden iron."

You can find these same things coming out in Soviet publications today, although not as bluntly. Soviet diplomatic proposals are replete with calls for peaceful co-existence, et cetera.

But to quote one recent publication, "The striving for peace, detente, and disarmament are not

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abstract appeals, but purposeful, practical, steps of the Communist Party, combined with strengthening the state's economic and defense might."

This was hardly the common western understanding of striving for peace, detente, and disarmament, but -- I'm quoting a Soviet academic now -- "In view of the keen political and ideological struggle in the world today, it is important to remember that when two classes say one and the same thing, it is not one and the same thing," and that quote could be the theme of our conference.

Such purposeful semantic confusion is complemented by outright deception and distortion. Gerhard Wettig mentioned that disarmament is the ideal socialism quotation. I give two examples of how it's been abused by Gromyko and Chernenko. Chernenko did it very recently, shortly before he died, in a letter to a Canadian student, and I give on page 21 the full quotation from Lenin on disarmament as the ideal socialism, in which he says, "To put disarmament in the program is tantamount to making a general declaration, 'We are opposed to the use of arms.' There is as little Marxism in this as there would be if we were to say, 'We are opposed to violence.'" In other words, disarmament is the ideal socialism but it can come only after the victory of the communist revolution in the western democracies. Until then the task of disarmament

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and arms control is subordinate to the task of triumphing in this global struggle.

Thus, despite the rhetoric about the value of disarmament, the Soviets reject this course as a path to peace. "In merciless polemics with bourgeois pacifists and social democratic dogmatists," declared an article in "World Economy and International Relations" in 1983, "V.I. Lenin demonstrated that the one true path of struggle against war is an upsurge of the revolutionary movement and the victory of the socialist revolution." The message to the magazine's Soviet readership could not have been clearer. Anyone who believes that arms control and political reconciliation, rather than revolution, are the way to peace, is not a communist, but a member of the bourgeoisie.

The implications of such a warning do not require elaboration, and the fate of Sakharov and other independent peace advocates testify to the seriousness of the Kremlin's purpose. It is clear, therefore, that Moscow's arms control policy is based on a double standard, encouraging peace movements in the West to put pressure on their governments to make concessions, while suppressing any independent peace movements in their own country.

To charges that such a strategy is unfair, the Soviets are likely to respond that fairness is a function

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of class positions. Quote, "The ruling classes of the bourgeois states are unable to accept as a norm of international law the socialist conception of fairness," a Soviet legal scholar has observed, "for the same reasons the socialist states are unable to accept the bourgeois conceptions of fairness."

In assessing Soviet arms control initiatives we should do well to keep this interpretation of fairness in mind.

MR. SEABURY: Thank you very much, Stan. A very interesting paper.

Our next commentator is David Yost from the Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California.

MR. YOST: Thank you. I'd like to begin by praising Stan's paper for its many virtues. If you get a chance to read it you'll find out it's very clearly and concisely written, based on excellent original sources, and it has a wonderful insight to space ratio. He gets a lot of insight into a small amount of space. He has a perceptive framework, a thesis to illustrate, and he illustrates it with several solid examples.

And his conclusions really can't be faulted. The Soviets do see arms control activities as instruments to be used, along with others, to achieve Soviet world hegemony, or as they would put it, "world peace through the worldwide

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triumph of Soviet-directed communism". Thank goodness, however, Stan did leave me a couple of nits to pick, a couple of grounds for nit-picking.

With regard to MBFR, for example -- I know this is a dangerous topic to bring up at this time of the day, and everyone's feeling sleepy, but the situation's a little more complex than the paper implies. It is absolutely true that one of the principal obstacles to an MBFR agreement is the data problem, the East-West disagreement as to the number of Warsaw Pact forces within the guidelines area. It is also true that the Soviets have regularly claimed for nearly a decade now that there is approximate East-West parity in the guidelines area, and they have hinted that the West is mistakenly assuming high levels of manning in Warsaw Pact units or in the quotation that is in the paper, that soldiers in support functions are being unfairly counted.

But these rationalizations or excuses, whatever you want to call them, that the Soviets have proffered to us really do not explain the East-West disagreement on numbers of Warsaw Pact troops. The disagreement is on the order of --

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-- moreover, this misrepresentation is fundamental to the basic Soviet deception in MBFR. That is, the Soviet

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agreement, in quotes, "in principle", to parity and the verification of parity, this agreement in principle is deceptive in that the Soviets have steadfastly resisted, for almost 12 years now, the asymmetrical reductions that would be necessary to reach parity, and because they have also rejected the associated measures that would be necessary to verify the reductions to parity and their maintenance.

And so it all reminds you of one of those cases that Bismarck noted in dealing with the Russians, "If they agree in principle, you know they have no intention of doing it in practice."

Now, another nit-pick concerns INF, intermediate-range nuclear forces. The paper points out correctly that one of the major Soviet misrepresentations during the 1979-83 INF affair was to claim that approximate parity in INF numbers already existed in Europe, and that the Soviets based this claim on force counts that excluded Soviet delivery systems comparable to the US systems that were included.

But, this is my nit-pick, there are much better sources on this than The Economist item that is cited. Above all, there is Gerhard Wettig's classic article in *Außenpolitik* (?), "The Soviet INF Data Critically Reviewed".

Moreover, The Economist item cited and this

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paper, I'm sorry to say, play the Soviet game by making it a NATO-Warsaw Pact INF comparison, when it is a US-Soviet negotiation at issue. This relates to my other nit-pick about INF, the Soviet attempt to count British and French forces with those of the United States.

The paper is absolutely correct, that this ploy was, to quote it, "Perhaps the most serious example of Soviet disinformation in the INF affair." But the reason given, that the Soviets equated three warhead MIRVed SS-20s with single warhead French SLBMs and IRBMs, and British SLBMs with MRVs, really misses the point. It misses the important political point. The political point is that the Soviets were able to use the British and French forces as an argument in their favor. They were able to make many people think that the Soviet Union deserved compensation from the United States for the existence of the British and French forces. They made the United States seem unfair in refusing to go along with this. They made Britain and France look like the obstacles to an arms control agreement. And they did succeed. This can be documented. The SPD and its party congresses, beginning in 1982, the Greek Socialist Party, Pasoc (?), and several other West European political groupings adopted the Soviet position and said that the US, British and French governments were wrong.

8-3

The Soviet argument is really fraudulent on nine grounds of a political and strategic nature. Before everyone faints, let me reassure that I'm not going to go into -- (laughter) -- all nine of the reasons, but if you're interested I can tell you sometime. They're rather fundamental reasons. For example, the fact is that the United States does not control British and French forces, the United States has no operational release authority over them. The fact is that the British and French forces can only protect Britain and France, if they can even do that, and they certainly cannot be used to threaten limited nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union nor can they be used to offer a nuclear guarantee to non-nuclear countries in Europe.

My final nitpick about the paper concerns the recurrent theme of Soviet insincerity. The paper keeps telling us that the Soviets are deceitful and most of the proofs consist of one Soviet spokesman contradicting what another Soviet spokesman has said about Soviet intentions. Obviously, one set of Soviet statements is regarded as more truthful than another set. And I generally agree with Stan's judgments as to which ones come closer to the truth. However, I think the paper could have placed more emphasis on the Soviet arms control proposals that are amazingly sincere and candid and really very frank

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in their intent.

The best example of this, in my mind at least, is the Soviet principle of equality and equal security. The Soviets have made little effort to conceal that this principle means that they think the Soviet Union should be accorded the right to nuclear equality with the combined arsenals of the United States, Britain, France and China. This would, obviously, make the Soviet Union superior to any of these countries in isolation.

I have no reason to doubt Soviet sincerity in holding to this principle. (Laughter.) It's a very Orwellian, "Animal Farm"-like definition of equality. It turns out in the Soviet view, "Some nuclear powers should be more equal than others."

I also believe that Andropov and Chernenko were sincere in offering to negotiate the strategic nuclear disarmament of Britain and France. They said that they would be willing to do this on a missile-for-missile basis. For each British and French missile dismantled, the Soviet Union would dismantle one until they had reached what the Soviets called, "a bilateral zero option." (Laughter.)

Now you may say, perhaps you're cynical that this would leave Britain and France with zero and the Soviet Union still heavily armed with nuclear weapons.

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But the fact of Soviet sincerity remains. I believe they would be prepared to carry out this proposal. (Laughter.)

Now I'll go even further. Tass said that Britain's complete nuclear disarmament and the removal of relevant foreign bases would create conditions in which the Soviet Union would guarantee that its nuclear weapons would not be trained on British territory. This may be sincere. The Soviet Union could afford to offer such a promise if all British nuclear capabilities were destroyed and all US installations removed from Britain. If war comes, the Soviets could then probably prefer to subjugate Britain by conventional means.

This relates to Soviet proposals for nuclear weapons free zones. Since 1980, the Soviets have been reviving their expressions of interest in the idea of nuclear weapons free zones in Europe, especially in Scandinavia and the Balkans and they have made promises not to use nuclear weapons against those countries, forbidding any deployments of nuclear weapons on their soil.

Once again, I think there's an element of sincerity here, not only because the Soviets would like to win without the risks and uncertainties associated with operational use of nuclear weapons. They would also like to gain the right to verify compliance by these new nuclear weapons-free countries, but also because Soviet operational

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research calculations indicate that in mountainous areas like Northern Norway, Greece and Turkey, the use of nuclear weapons is very disadvantageous for the attacker. It slows down the rate of advance even more than on normal terrain.

In the light of this principle that the Soviets may sometimes be sincere, it might be wise to look again at what is in the paper about the Soviet no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge.

The paper says that despite Brezhnev's pledge, Soviet military literature still talks routinely about the desirability of using nuclear weapons first. Therefore, the paper concludes the Soviets are hypocrites and liars.

I would at least mention a more nuanced interpretation. If we entertain the possibility that the Soviets may be sincere, how could they reconcile their military doctrine and the no-first-use pledge.

John Hines and Phillip Peterson have suggested this logic. First of all, Soviet doctrine holds that the Soviet armed forces must be prepared to fight and win both with and without the use of nuclear weapons. Their doctrine also recognizes the many risks, uncertainties and drawbacks associated with using those weapons.

Those weapons can disrupt their own command and control, create hazards and obstacles that slow down the rate of advance and, to say nothing about contaminating

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what they're trying to conquer. In other words, their doctrine does recognize the desirability of winning without use of nuclear weapons if all nuclear use, that is use on either side, can be avoided. But how can they avoid all use of nuclear weapons? The answer, the restraining effect of blackmail of Soviet nuclear strike capabilities, of Soviet escalation dominance, if you like that term. That may possibly dissuade the US from using nuclear weapons. There are a number of Soviet statements to the effect that Soviet nuclear strike capabilities may neutralize US nuclear threats, that the US may not go nuclear, for fear of Soviet retaliation. They may be increasingly confident of an ability to deter our deterrent.

On the other hand, the same doctrine tells us that if the Soviets detect any enemy intention to use nuclear weapons, they intend to beat the enemy to the punch, as they put it, to forestall the enemy in using nuclear weapons by pre-empting his use, because of the advantages of going first, that the paper properly calls attention to.

But this is not inconsistent with the Soviets preferring to win without use of nuclear weapons and in the Soviet mind, it's probably not inconsistent with their no-first-use pledge because they play claim at least they

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would only be acting prudently on evidence of enemy intentions to go first. However you resolve the question, we can be sure that if the Soviets ever use nuclear weapons they will claim that they were forced to pre-empt by Western action.

Let's assume the Soviets are sincere with their own interpretation of their no-first-use pledge. What can NATO do about it? They have put NATO into an uncomfortable propaganda position because they have simultaneously put NATO into a constrained strategic situation.

The West has become increasingly dependent on nuclear threats that Western public opinion finds less and less reassuring and so when they make a no-first-use pledge, it's a way of underlining the diminishing consensus behind NATO strategy in the West and, in fact, in addition to underlining that consensus, it's a way of undermining that consensus.

And so this is my conclusion, this is the main lesson of Stan's paper. Although Americans and other westerners tend to see arms control as somehow an alternative to developing military strength, the Soviets see arms control as a means to improve their own military strength to move the correlation of forces further in their direction. They work to make arms control the means of competition, a means of eroding our security. We play

8-9

into their hands if we assume that the Soviets see arms control as we tend to as an enterprise for mutual benefit and common security. They're exploiting the West's interest in arms control to seize and maintain military advantage. I don't know if I should give a couple more examples or should call it to an end. What do you think, Mr. Chairman?

MR. SEABURY: You've got a couple of minutes.

MR. YOST: Okay. If you'll indulge me, I will.

I would say that they're doing this on two levels. One level is the Gerhard Wettig level, what he called the "government to government level," and that is the actual treaty constraints negotiated with governments and the other level is the level of process and public opinion. On the level of treaty constraints, let me give you an example from SALT I in 1972.

In SALT I, the Soviets were given the option, which they exercise, of building almost 300 more SLBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles, than the United States was allowed by SALT I. Now why did the United States agree that the Soviets should have more missiles like that?

One of the reasons, according to Henry Kissinger and other US negotiators, was that the Soviets stressed, quote, "geographic asymmetries," which the Soviets argued, favored American submarines. They pointed out that the United States has excellent warm-water ports, has easy

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access to the open ocean while the "poor old Soviet Union" has to face a lot of ice, Soviet submarines have a long way to go to get to the open ocean, and the Americans bought this argument. Kissinger, at least, used this argument, made it public in helping to sell SALT I and the asymmetrical force levels allowed in that treaty.

However, the very next year, 1973, the Soviets tested their main SLBM on the new Deltas and arranged 4,200 nautical miles and they then got it up to 4,900 nautical miles range. This means they can launch these missiles in port in Murmansk, Archangel and elsewhere and strike the United States. So much for the "geographical asymmetry favoring the US.

Another example, and this is, again state-to-state disinformation, is the definition of the heavy missile in SALT I. This concerns ICBMs this time. Throughout the negotiation, the Soviets consistently rebuffed American attempts to define a heavy missile in writing. They kept saying, "We all know what a heavy missile is. There's no need to write down a definition. In the end, all the United States got was a unilateral statement by the United States defining a heavy missile, which the Soviets were under no obligation to observe and which they did not observe and a very vaguely worded common understanding, limiting increases in ICBM silo volume, and I quote the

8-11

agreement, "to 10 to 15 percent of the present dimensions."

Now the Soviets interpreted this to mean they could increase the size of their silos by 10 to 15 percent in height and in diameter rather than in total volume. And the result was a much greater increase than the US assumed could happen. As a result, the Soviets now have approximately 360 SS-19s in silos that were originally much smaller. Each of those SS-19s is about the same size as the MX and yet they're called "light ICBMs" by the Soviets, and appropriately so, because they are light and yet the SS-18s have twice the throw weight. This enormous Soviet ICBM force, about three times as many warheads on ICBMs as the United States has, has made the US ICBM force vulnerable to Soviet destruction.

This has happened despite the arms control process in which the United States attempted persistently to educate the Soviets about how destabilizing it was to threaten retaliatory forces.

The Soviets were more persuaded by the unilateral advantages of being able to limit damage to themselves by being able to attack our forces than by US arms control theory.

Finally, at the level of process, the arms control process is a valuable instrument for the Soviets to the extent that it can be used to undermine the Western will



8-12

to compete in investments in military strength. The very existence of arms control negotiations raises public expectations about non-competitive solutions.

As Mr. Bittman said this morning, people want to believe in this message of reassurance. The existence of negotiations promotes a belief in arms control as an alternative to unilateral means of assuring security. It makes the public think the Soviets have endorsed Western concepts of security, has a depressant effect on Western military programs and the process has this impact on governments and on intelligence services, not only on the informed public.

The existence of the SALT process helps to explain why the US intelligence community, for most of the 1960s and 1970s, chronically underestimated Soviet force procurement plans.

Well, I think my time has come to an end. Thank you.



ATTACH B

6-2

SESSION II
COLLOQUIUM: "THE SOVIET DEFENSE BURDEN
AND THE SPECTER OF WAR"

PAPER: [] CORNELL UNIVERSITY
COMMENTATOR: [] PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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STAT

(Speaker already in progress.)

[] -- war wasn't imminent, where I think
almost certainly he knew otherwise. But I think he did
speak his true beliefs about the long-term danger. Europe
faced a war that inevitably would involve the Soviet Union.
He stated this in an unpublished speech in 1952, and
repeated it publicly in '27. The problem for Soviet
security policy was to delay Soviet involvement as long as
possible, then intervene in the war under the most favorable
circumstances for the Soviet Union.

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In the 1930s, especially as several commentators
have noted just before me, especially between '39 and '41,
there was a strong disparity between Stalin's public
downplay of the specific danger of a German attack on the
Soviet Union, and his real fears of such an attack, fears
that led him to devote tremendous resources to prepare for
the war, as several speakers have just noted.

The effect of Stalin's public depreciation of the
war danger in those years was to deceive the Soviet people
and the Soviet Army so that they were taken by surprise when

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the Germans attacked. Once the war was over, in '46, Stalin took credit for anticipating the war, and for effectively preparing for the war by developing the necessary economic potential to support war, and I believe both claims have merit. There's no question that he was responsible for the tremendous losses they suffered. But I think those two claims stand up. He did anticipate, over the long term, a real danger of war, and he did try to prepare for it by concentrating on economic development, and particularly the development of heavy industry.

In '46 Stalin offered a similar analysis of the situation following the war, and proposed a similar strategy to cope with Russia's security problem in the post-war period. Both in 1946 and in 1952, Stalin spoke publicly of the inevitability of war between the capitalist states, but not of the inevitable war against the Soviet Union. That is to say, Stalin implicitly downgraded the danger of war to the Soviet Union. He did this in '46, he repeated it in '52, in "The Economic Problems of Socialism". I think this was the line. Of course, he didn't give major speeches in between. But I think this really was the line that he established for the post-war period.

And early in the Cold War, Zhdanov (?) made this point explicitly, downgrading the danger of war to

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the Soviet Union. Here I'm quoting. This is from his speech to the Cominform in 1947. "All the hullabaloo of the imperialist agents about the danger of war is designed to frighten the weak-nerved and unstable, and to extort concessions to the aggressors by means of intimidation." I am going to anticipate a little bit what comes later, to say that this is really a perfect description of the Soviet scare campaign and the war danger that developed in the early 1980s.

But he clearly was downgrading the danger of an attack on the Soviet Union during the Cold War and this accords with Stalin's implicit estimates.

Though the aim of the public assessment of the war danger, downgrading it, clearly was designed to quiet the fears of the Soviet people who had, of course, just suffered the terrible war with tremendous losses, but I think it also corresponded to Stalin's real assessment of the war danger. I think, in his own mind, he downgraded that danger.

I don't think we can understand Stalin's actions in the Cold War, in Eastern Europe, in Korea, in the Berlin blockade, unless we suppose that he thought the danger of war really was very slight. Otherwise such actions really would have been unacceptably risky, when the United States had the nuclear bomb and the potential to develop strategic

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forces to employ against the Soviet Union.

To sum up on Stalin, he manipulated the specter of war, publicly exaggerating the threat in the early years, in the twenties, when he must have known it to be remote, and downgrading the likelihood of a German attack on the Soviet Union in the 1930s, when it manifestly was high, and even in 1941, when war was imminent. By then Stalin's power was so great that he had no need to justify to the Politburo or to the public a rapidly growing defense burden.

In the Cold War also, Stalin's vast personal power enabled him to impose a massive defense burden on the country, even while publicly downgrading the war danger.

In the Cold War, however, unlike the pre-war years, Stalin truly downgraded the risk of war.

The post-Stalin leadership initially lacked Stalin's confidence that the war danger could be controlled. Hence, there was the early consensual decision to end the Korean War, which was done, as you remember, very shortly after Stalin's death.

Subsequently Khrushchev, in particular, became confident that the war danger could be controlled. He denied, at the 20th Party Congress, Lenin's doctrine on the inevitability of war while capitalism existed, and

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he even spoke of the possibility of excluding world war from the life of society, while capitalism still existed.

And, here again, I think this is supported with his real beliefs. Khrushchev clearly behaved as though the war danger was slight, and controllable by the Soviet Union. Otherwise, it would be impossible to understand why he imposed two Berlin crises and put the missiles into Cuba. That action in particular represented, I think, the height of confidence that the danger of war could be controlled by the Soviet Union. In that case, of course, it involved accepting a tremendous defeat.

So, I think there was an accord in the -- under Khrushchev between his downgrading of the danger of war in propaganda and in doctrine, and his real beliefs about the small danger of war.

In the early Brezhnev period, propaganda and political behavior, again, were in rough accord. This was at the time of the Vietnam War, when the Soviet leadership declared there was an increased danger of the US-Soviet military conflict. The danger of war had increased.

And, at the same time, they substantially increased defense spending, as though they took this danger seriously.

However, with detente in the early seventies,

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beginning around 1972, a new disparity appeared between Soviet declaratory doctrine on the reduced danger of war and Soviet defense spending, which continue to rise as it had from '65, from the period of the Vietnam War, at a substantial rate, throughout the whole period of detente.

In other words, the Soviet Union failed to capitalize on the reduced war danger, to reduce their mounting defense burden. They chose, instead, to use detente to improve the military balance with the United States. That's part one. That's my brief interpretive survey that carries us through the 1970s.

Now I'd like to discuss the ascendancy of the war danger theme since 24 June 1980.

Throughout the 1970s, despite the downward trend in US-Soviet relations, the basic Soviet line was that the danger of war had been pushed back. However, adverse developments after the Vienna summit of 1979, led to an abandonment of this position.

June 24, 1980, the Central Committee met in plenary session and adopted a resolution on the international situation and Soviet foreign policy. That, of course, is the stereotype designation of the discussion of that topic.

And in that resolution they announced a change in the Soviet assessment of the war danger and instructed

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the Politburo to continue the general line adopted at the previous congresses, the 24th and the 25th, even in the changed circumstances, when US action had given rise to an increase danger of war. The resolution called for vigilance and the strengthened defense capability.

The reasons given for the increased war danger were basically two. The NATO buildup, designed to change the military balance, and they specified particularly the deployment of the Euromissiles. Second, the rapprochement of the United States and China, on an anti-Soviet basis. This was the second reason for the increased danger of war.

Now, the second reason later was dropped, leaving as the root cause of the increased war danger the United States-NATO military buildup.

Now, there was -- despite the enunciation of this major change in declaratory doctrine, there clearly were disagreements among the top leadership on the significance of this new doctrine on the war danger. Brezhnev clearly was reluctant. He tried to limit the consequences following from this change of doctrine. And he clearly was trying to maintain the lines of policy as he had established them in the period of detente, with some modifications.

Andropov, on the other hand, attempted to draw wider implications from the change of doctrine. The danger was acute. The world was sliding towards the

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brink of nuclear war. On one occasion he said it was already at the brink, the United States had pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war.

There was a sense of urgency that he communicated, in connection with the danger of war. The Politburo divided. Andropov was supported, after a time, by Ustinov, and very strongly by Gromyko. Brezhnev was supported by Tikhonov and Chernenko, his factional allies.

Despite these disagreements, the new thesis on the war danger became the key theme in foreign propaganda, and pronouncement designed to frighten the western nations and intimidate their governments, particularly, of course, in connection with the Euromissile deployment.

But it was not limited to foreign propaganda. It also served to factionate the Soviet Army and to tell ordinary Soviet citizens that there was a real danger of war. The need for such a domestic campaign was strikingly asserted by Marshal Ustarkov, and I'll have to read the quote. It will be, I think, almost the only one.

This is in "Communiste Number 10", 1981, about a year after the Central Committee resolution. "It is essential to convey to the Soviet people in a more profound and better-reasoned form the truth about the existing threat of the danger of war. It should not, of course, be over-dramatized. But it is obligatory to show the

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seriousness of the contemporary international situation. This is a task not just for the political organs and political workers of the Army and Navy, but also for the party and Soviet organs, all public organizations, and for the entire propaganda apparatus. This task stems from the demands of Lenin's party regarding the further strengthening of the country's defense.

Now, it is rare, in my experience unprecedented, for a professional military officer to task the entire propaganda apparatus, and Ugarkov's attempt to do so may reflect a concern that the Soviet people do not see the need to prepare for war, or perhaps harbor doubts that such preparations would improve the country's prospects in the event of war.

Elements of the military may have pressed for the new doctrine, although, of course, this was a decision taken by the Politburo. Certainly the military seized on it for their particular purposes, to persuade servicemen that war, indeed, could happen, to claim increased resources for defense. And Ugarkov pushed that very hard. To counter laxity in Soviet society. And this also became a theme.

And finally, to prod the political leaders to cope with the secular economic slowdown, which clearly had long-term implications for defense.

Now, the aims of the foreign propaganda campaign

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are clear, and they have considerable success in frightening the nations of Western Europe. But the campaign failed to produce a sufficiently high level of fear to prevent the deployment of the Euromissiles. In that sense it was a failure.

Although, as someone pointed out earlier, there was a residue. I think it was Professor Ellison. And the campaign has left a heritage.

To achieve success in preventing the Euromissile deployment, it might have been necessary to supplement the harsh words about the war danger with risky actions, but the Soviet leaders were not willing to take such actions.

The domestic campaign succeeded in raising popular concerns about the war danger, but it contained certain anomalies. First, the Soviet people were told that war was not out of the question and it was necessary to increase military preparations to cope with the increased war danger.

At the same time, they were told such a war would be a catastrophe for humanity; there would be no victors. So, the Soviet Union was to prepare for the war, which was becoming more probable, but they couldn't win such a war and would suffer as the rest of the world population would suffer. I found this anomalous.

Second, Soviet propaganda called President Reagan

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a dangerous leader. They compared him to Hitler. Nevertheless, in 1983, they broke off negotiations with the United States on arms control, clearly raising military tensions even higher.

No wonder the Soviet people became frightened so that it became necessary, during 1984, to tone down the domestic campaign somewhat.

The aim of this foreign propaganda campaign was clear, but what purpose was served by the campaign aimed at the Soviet people? Soviet people were not asked to make sacrifices; they were not told they would have to do without consumer goods; the leaders kept on making promises about improved living standards; they were not asked to work longer hours. Chernenko explicitly said that wouldn't be necessary. They were required to work harder and to accept stronger discipline. But one may question how well this aim was served by threatening the Soviet people with war, imposed on them by a vicious enemy, a war that they couldn't win.

The impression left by these contradictory themes is that the various campaigns on the war danger that have been targeted to distinct audiences are not elements in a comprehensive and integrated scheme, but separate strands from a divided leadership that has lost something of its internal coherence, hence of its capacity to devise a

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coherent strategy. The thesis of the increased war danger seemed to have served as a multi-purpose tool to intimidate the West, provide an increased sense of purpose to Soviet military training, and to strengthen popular dependence on the Soviet state.

The thesis may serve tactical objectives in the future as well. I don't mean to downgrade the potential of Soviet propaganda. If civilian consumption continues to stagnate or, as could happen, begins to fall, the war danger thesis may yet serve to support demands that the Soviet people actually make sacrifices for defense.

Abroad, western public opinion remains susceptible to Soviet scare tactics. Hence, ad hoc campaigns based on the war danger can be expected in the future, and especially if combined with provocative and threatening actions, could have a powerful or even devastating effect.

It's now five years since the Central Committee first declared that the danger of war was increasing, and began employing this tenet in the diverse propaganda campaigns that I've just discussed. Do they actually believe their own propaganda or, as has happened under Stalin, do their real views diverge from what they say publicly?

This is obviously a very difficult question.

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Only indirect evidence is available to try to answer it, based on the level of Soviet preparations for war, and on Soviet willingness to take risky actions in their foreign policy.

It hardly seems credible to me that the Soviet leaders really believed, in 1980 or subsequently, that the United States or its allies were about to force war upon the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, even less than in earlier decades, when the United States had military superiority, a Soviet-American confrontation threatening war was hardly likely, absent Soviet provocative actions directed against major American interests.

Obviously, putting missiles into Cuba and refusing to remove them would have created a serious danger of war. But the Soviets really were not willing to take such provocative actions. Khrushchev accepted defeat and pulled out the missiles.

Unless the Soviet leaders themselves, in the 1980s, contemplated taking such provocative actions, and as yet they have not done so, it is difficult to suppose that they really anticipated a heightened danger of imminent war, war in the near term.

As regards to the long term, however, the matter may be different. There are, indeed, grounds for Soviet fears for their future security position, stemming from

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the secular decline in Soviet economic growth and the risk of a consequent deterioration of the military balance. The increasing disparity in the output of the Soviet and US economies has been noted in publications by high level political consultants of the Soviet leadership. Were it to continue, this growing disparity, over the next decade, Soviet efforts to keep up with an arms race might be severely strained, and in time, Soviet security might be jeopardized.

Granted this prospect of possible economic and military decline and of the renewed American military buildup beginning in the late 1970s under President Carter, a Soviet leadership that has been indoctrinated in the use of Lenin and Stalin and the inevitability of war, while imperialism survives, and that it demonstrated, in the past two decades, a renewed belief in the utility of military force, might very well have concluded, in 1980, that the long-term danger of war was substantially greater than had been thought previously.

In this sense, the Central Committee resolution asserting the increased danger of war may reflect the leadership's true beliefs and could prove to have a lasting influence on Soviet military spending and on the goals of Soviet foreign policy.

MR. SEABURY: Thank you very much, Professor

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Rush. Our commentator, our 15-minute commentator, is Professor Cyril Black of Princeton.

[] Thank you, Mr. Chair. I hope you STAT
all have a chance to read [] paper, because STAT
especially in the second part, dealing with the last
five years, since the Central Committee declared officially
the increased danger of war. He makes an important
contribution, not only substantively, to our discussion,
but also methodologically. And I'd like to comment
briefly, in the short time at my disposal, on three issues.

First, he discusses the question of leadership's
true beliefs, namely what I would call information. We
talk a lot about disinformation. You can't have
disinformation without information. I think it's
important or, rather, it's a danger at a conference like
this, to discuss propaganda and disinformation, C&D,
without discussing I, information. Because
underlying all of these particular issues, the Soviets must
believe something. Thus, to talk about their lies and
propaganda without discussing in each case what they
really believe, is likely to mislead us.

So far, I think George Breslauer's the only
person who has mentioned their true beliefs, in his
discussion of the political code of the Politburo. And
it would be helpful if everybody could pick up this theme

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and indicate what the Soviets really think they are doing while they engage in disinformation and propaganda.

One is reminded of the Soviet painter who is commissioned to paint a portrait of a general who had lost his left arm during the war. He had three choices. The first was information, namely, to paint him as he actually was, with his left arm -- what is left of his left arm rolled up in his sleeve. His second choice was disinformation, to paint him with two normal arms.

His third choice was propaganda, or in the artistic sense, socialist realism, turn him around to the right and paint only his right side, so the question of his left arm doesn't arise.

So, you have three issues in these various cases, not only C and D, but also I, which it seems to me are important in their interconnections. And his paper, Myron discusses, in some detail, or seeks to find out what they really believe, as well as what they say.

During my last visit to the Soviet Union, just over a year ago, I was faced with a barrage of what was either propaganda, disinformation, or information, on a somewhat similar subject, namely the burden of defense. And there were two things which were stressed. One, of course, was the -- our emplacement of -- proposed emplacement of 108 Pershings and 464 Cruise missiles in

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Western Europe. That was stressed a great deal. That was stressed a great deal before the Soviet public. Some of our people at the Embassy thought that was propaganda, namely exaggerating the dangers of these missiles as a means of whipping up enthusiasm on the part of the Soviet public and also, of course, discouraging the West Germans and others

A second theme which they stressed was the danger of another 20 years' arms race, as a result of our "Star Wars" activity. Their claim was that here they had finally built up equivalence with the United States, as they saw it, and now they would have to start another 20 years of arms race in which, instead of devoting their resources to the building of the Soviet society as they wished, they'd have to devote them to trying to catch up with us.

Here again, it seems to me, if I were a Soviet citizen, I would have been concerned with these two things. It's quite possible, it seems to me, that propaganda and information may be the same thing. Much information is real and the fear of these developments on their part makes perfectly good propaganda in Western Europe.

So, it seems to me that each case that comes up, we should try to find out what the information is, how it is used, to what extent it's the same thing as propaganda, which must be true in many cases, to what extent the

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propaganda is an exaggeration of the information and, of course in the case of disinformation that's a rather simpler point.

A second issue that Myron brought up is the stresses, divisions, within the Soviet leadership, especially on the subject as to whether, as to the danger of war, whether the danger of nuclear war is increasing, and what this means. Here again, I think this is the first time this has been mentioned at the conference. We tend to treat the Soviet Union as a single unit. The term "monolithic" is sometimes used. It was actually used, I think, by one of the commentators. Whereas we all know, of course, that it's been polythnic for many years.

It seems to me, here again, in discussing information, what we believe, we should also discuss divisions within the Soviet leadership on these issues. It's a country with many specific interests, of course, as we all know, and it would be inconceivable that they would reach complete agreement, especially on such key issues as this, even though in their propaganda, of course, they have to express it with a single voice.

But in this particular case, even though the leaders may be speaking to different audiences and, therefore, speaking from a different point of view, their

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different views were all set forth in the Soviet press, so it must be pretty confusing to the Soviet newspaper readers to see these different views expressed.

But I think that Myron made an important contribution to our discussion in stressing the variety of views held, even in the top leadership, on a key issue like this, and certainly on many other issues there must be extensive discussion.

I never knew exactly why Goparkov was ousted as Chief of Staff, but I notice that he has returned again, this time as a dissident, unless he is on his way back to power, writing this book about the dangers of war. It would appear that he was stressing the dangers of war too much and trying to get too large a budget for the military, and was released on that basis.

In any event, in studying dissidents, the most important dissidents are probably within the Communist Party, perhaps within the Politburo, and they certainly fight each other extensively in various forms. And this feature of divisions within the Soviet leadership is an important element. It seems to me, in analyzing their disinformation and propaganda.

And finally -- I have seven more minutes, Mr. Chair, in a rather secondary note, Myron mentions the danger, the fear of the Soviets, that war might result

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from local wars escalating into nuclear wars. This is a rather new theme. Until recently one thought chiefly of nuclear wars -- chiefly of wars in the West, arising from the European situation. But the Soviets, like us apparently, are beginning to realize that wars in different parts of the world might lead to larger conflicts.

In this connection I see evidence of something like the Americanization of Soviet foreign policy. There are certain areas in which they are becoming more like us, or perhaps copying us. In the old days, back 30 and 40 years ago, when I and some of the rest of you were beginning to work on these subjects, we thought in terms of the Soviets using communist parties. It was almost automatic that in Indonesia, in China -- we saw it in China, of course, and other places, the communist parties would seize powers, with Soviet support, and they would take over the country, and then the Soviet Union would have that country under its belt. And we saw the countries under communist leadership growing from the Soviet Union to one-third of the world's population, between 1945 and 1949, and it seemed like a rather dramatic event, although since then, of course, things have changed.

Let me mention a few ways in which they have Americanized their foreign policy. One is the weakening

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role of ideology. As I mentioned, in the good old days everything was done through communist parties, whereas now they may do that, but they can have perfectly good relations and stimulate revolutions in countries with no communist parties.

The second point is major support for countries with alien ideologies, like Syria and Libya, and Egypt earlier, who suppress communist parties and get Soviet support. Support isn't exactly the right term here. They sell the arms to Syria and Libya, for dollars, dollars which come from the oil producing countries. These are American dollars. So, indirectly, we're providing the dollars with which these countries pay the Soviet Union for the arms.

But, nevertheless, it isn't support in the same way that we support Yugoslavia and China, which have alien ideologies.

Another way in which there is some similarity is the tail tends to wag the dog. In Syria, they got into a good deal of trouble, which the Soviets tried to pull them out of, I think, getting involved too deeply in Lebanon and dragging the Soviets along with them. The Libyans, perhaps, have done this also to some extent.

We faced this with the Vietnamese government, and with others at various times.

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But there are also important differences, of course, and one shouldn't exaggerate the Americanization theme. I think the chief difference is that the Soviet ideology recognizes the importance and inevitability of revolutions, not because they have a good ideology, but perhaps by chance they see revolutions as normal, and they seek to take advantage of them. Whereas our ideology tends to see revolutions as fires which have to be put out. We tend to see countries as either totalitarian or democratic. Whereas no country in the third world has the capacity to be either democratic or totalitarian, and so we're missing out on the wide range of possibilities which are the real ones, of course.

Mr. Bittman urged us to develop a positive program for combatting the Soviet Union through ideology. I think the first step in such a program would be to develop a theory of development, of modernization, which is realistic, which recognizes the inevitability of revolutions and which seeks to treat them as best we can.

We'll have an opportunity for this very shortly in the Philippines. A big revolution is coming up there in two or three years. It will have all the characteristics of Nicaragua, on a much larger scale, and I hope that by that time the agencies sponsoring this conference will have their program in place. Thank you.